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This dissertation presents two studies on the complexity of qualitative 
accounting disclosures. Reporting is considered to be more complex as it becomes 
longer and/or less readable. 
The first study examines investors’ reactions to disclosure readability. The 
SEC’s emphasis on the use of plain English is designed to make disclosures more 
readable and more informative. Using an experiment, I find that more readable 
disclosures lead to stronger reactions from small investors, so that changes in 
valuation judgments are more positive when news is good and more negative when 
news is bad. Drawing on research in psychology to explain this result, I predict and 
find that processing fluency from a more readable disclosure acts as a subconscious 
heuristic cue and increases investors’ beliefs that they can rely on the disclosure. 
While I do not find that more readable disclosures directly increase perceptions of 
management credibility, I do find evidence of an indirect effect operating through 
feelings of processing fluency. In supplemental analyses, I find that investors who 
receive more readable disclosures revise their valuation judgments to be less extreme 
when they are explicitly made aware of the potential for variation in readability. I 
discuss potential explanations for these revised valuation judgments. 
 The second study examines managers’ reporting choices with respect to 
disclosure complexity. Prior research finds that the reporting complexity of qualitative 
disclosures increases as firm performance deteriorates, and that reporting complexity 
may dampen investors’ short-term reactions to news. While some argue that managers 
intentionally increase reporting complexity to hide bad performance, others suggest 
that bad performance is instead simply more difficult to describe in fewer and more 
readable words. I use a controlled experiment to investigate these explanations, and 
find greater support for the idea that bad performance is inherently more difficult to 
describe than good performance. Counter to arguments made in the archival literature, 
I find that individuals provide longer, but more readable, disclosures when 
performance is bad and they are given a goal of reporting strategically rather than 
reporting accurately. This contradicts the claim that managers intentionally obfuscate 
poor performance in order to mitigate negative reactions to bad news. My study also 
provides evidence in a controlled setting on how other linguistic choices vary with 
performance and goals. 
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CHAPTER 1 
PROCESSING FLUENCY AND INVESTORS’ REACTIONS TO DISCLOSURE 
READABILITY 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 The Securities and Exchange Commission has placed increasing emphasis on 
providing clear and readable financial disclosures. The Plain English Rule (421(d)), 
passed in 1998, requires that issuers adhere to plain English principles in the design of 
firm prospectuses. The rule is accompanied by a Plain English Handbook (SEC 
[1998]) that provides both linguistic and formatting suggestions for preparing plain 
English disclosures. In its Plain English Handbook, the SEC encourages firms to 
adopt the suggestions in all of their communications (SEC [1998]).  
 In response to the SEC’s agenda, recent work in the archival accounting 
literature uses techniques from computational linguistics to investigate disclosure 
readability (Li [2008], You and Zhang [2009]) and its effects on the behavior of small 
investors (Miller [2010]). These archival studies argue that less readable disclosures 
may limit investors’ ability or willingness to extract information from relatively long 
and complex documents, such as 10-K filings (Grossman and Stiglitz [1980], 
Bloomfield [2002], Hirshleifer and Teoh [2003]). I use a controlled experiment to 
provide complementary evidence on a different effect of disclosure readability that 
may not be as intuitive to managers, investors and regulators. My findings show that 
disclosure readability can affect investors’ reactions, even when it does not affect the 
amount of information that they acquire. 
 Research in the psychology literature suggests that processing fluency from a 
more readable disclosure will increase investors’ beliefs that they can rely on the 
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information in the disclosure. Processing fluency is an individual’s subjective feeling 
about how easy it is for them to process information. Prior research has shown that 
feelings of processing fluency are subconsciously treated by individuals as a heuristic 
cue that information can be relied upon in making related judgments (Shah and 
Oppenheimer [2007], Hafner and Stapel [2010]). My experiment holds disclosure 
length and total information constant, and isolates the effects of disclosure readability 
on investors’ reactions to both good and bad news. I focus on small investors in my 
study, both to be consistent with prior archival literature (Miller [2010]) and also 
because of the SEC’s assertion that clear writing is primarily intended to assist the 
“least-sophisticated investors” (SEC [1998]). The use of an experiment allows me to 
capture measures of processing fluency and disclosure reliance that are not directly 
observable in archival data.  
 Prior research on processing fluency also suggests that a fluent message can 
lead to more favorable evaluations of the messenger (Oppenheimer [2006]). This 
implies that more readable disclosures may increase investors’ perceptions of 
management credibility, regardless of whether a disclosure conveys good or bad news. 
My experiment allows me to isolate judgments about the manager from judgments 
about the firm, and to tie my research to the larger literature in accounting on the 
determinants of management credibility.  
 Finally, the use of an experiment allows me to provide evidence on whether 
investors’ judgments change when the potential for variation in disclosure readability 
is made salient. I use a two-stage experiment to examine whether investors’ valuation 
judgments change once they explicitly consider that the same information could have 
been presented in a more or less readable way.  
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 In Stage 1 of my experiment I collect judgments on my primary measures of 
interest. I present 234 participants with background information on a fictitious soft 
drink company and ask them to provide initial valuation judgments. Participants then 
receive a press release about the financial performance of the firm. Between-subjects 
manipulations alter the readability of the press release and whether the press release 
conveys good or bad news. For the manipulation of readability, I vary characteristics 
of the press release so that they violate (less readable condition) or conform to (more 
readable condition) linguistic and formatting suggestions outlined in the SEC’s Plain 
English Handbook (SEC [1998]). After reading the release, participants provide a 
revised judgment on the appropriate valuation of the firm. Participants also provide 
judgments about the extent to which they feel that they can rely on the information in 
the press release, their feelings about processing fluency, and their perceptions of 
management credibility. The difference between the revised and initial valuation 
judgments serves as a measure of the strength of investors’ reactions to the press 
release containing my manipulations. 
 As predicted by theories of processing fluency, I find that more readable 
disclosures lead to stronger reactions to both good and bad news. Changes in 
participants’ valuation judgments in response to a more readable press release are 
more positive when news is good and more negative when news is bad. These results 
arise despite the fact that, in my setting, variation in readability does not lead to 
detectable differences in the number of questions that participants answer correctly 
about the information in the press release. This suggests that my results are not driven 
by differences in the amount of information that participants acquire. Instead, greater 
readability increases participants’ reliance on the information in the press release. 
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Mediation analysis confirms that participants’ reliance on the release is driven by 
increased processing fluency (i.e., participants’ personal feelings about disclosure 
readability, or processing ease). Counter to my expectations, I do not find that more 
readable press releases directly increase participants’ judgments about the credibility 
of management. However, I do find evidence that readability has a positive and 
significant indirect effect on management credibility, and that this indirect effect 
operates through increased feelings of processing fluency. A significant indirect effect 
in the absence of a direct or total effect could mean that that there are one or more 
offsetting indirect effects that work in the opposite direction of fluency (MacKinnon, 
Krull and Lockwood [2000], Shrout and Bolger [2002], Zhao, Lynch Jr., and Chen 
[2010]), or that the sample size is not large enough to detect a moderate direct or total 
effect, should it exist (Shrout and Bolger [2002]). 
 Stage 2 of my experiment provides supplementary evidence on whether 
investors’ valuation judgments change once they explicitly consider the potential for 
variation in disclosure readability. In Stage 2, I present participants with the press 
release that they were initially shown, as well as an additional press release from the 
other readability condition (still containing only good or bad news). The press releases 
are presented side-by-side to facilitate their comparison. Providing access to press 
releases at both levels of readability makes salient the fact that managers have a choice 
when it comes to disclosure readability.  
Analysis of Stage 2 valuation judgments shows that participants who initially 
received the more readable disclosures provide valuation judgments in Stage 2 that are 
less extreme than the valuation judgments they provide in Stage 1, to the point where 
the effect of readability on investors’ reactions  is no longer significant for either good 
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or bad news. In addition, participants strongly agree that the actual information 
contained in the more and less readable press releases is identical. Combined, these 
results suggest that the stronger reactions of participants found in Stage 1 in response 
to more readable disclosures may be unintentional (Kahneman and Tversky [1996], 
Tan, Libby, and Hunton [2002]), which is consistent with findings in psychology 
showing that individuals are not influenced by processing fluency once they are aware 
of its source (Schwarz [2004], Alter and Oppenheimer [2009]). It is also possible that 
revisions to valuation judgments in Stage 2 are driven by consideration of managers’ 
strategic choices when it comes to disclosure readability. I examine both possibilities 
in supplemental analyses included in Section 1.4.4. My results provide more support 
for the former explanation than the latter. 
My results call into question the idea that more readable disclosures are always 
beneficial. The fact that participants who received the more readable press releases in 
Stage 1 provide less extreme valuation judgments in Stage 2 suggests that, upon 
further consideration, participants feel as though they reacted too strongly to the 
information that was presented in a more attractive package (i.e., with clearer 
formatting and language). In other words, more readable disclosures may cause 
investors to overreact to information, particularly those who are the least sophisticated. 
This does not imply that more readable disclosures are necessarily bad, but it does 
indicate that the benefits of more readable disclosures are less clear-cut than has been 
argued by the SEC [SEC 1998] and in prior literature (e.g., Li [2008], You and Zhang 
[2009], Miller [2010]).  
 My findings also suggest that readability will affect investors even if it does 
not affect their willingness or ability to acquire information from long and complex 
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financial disclosures (e.g., Li [2008], You and Zhang [2009], Miller [2010]). I find 
that the clarity with which information is conveyed will affect readers’ feelings of 
processing fluency, and have important (and perhaps unintentional) consequences for 
related judgments and decisions. Thus, despite the focus on the readability of 10-K 
filings in the prior literature, my results suggest that it is also important to consider the 
readability of shorter disclosures as well (like press releases).  
My results are likely to generalize beyond press releases. SEC filings and 
verbal (e.g., conference call) disclosures vary substantially in the ease with which they 
can be processed. In addition, subjective perceptions of processing fluency are likely 
to vary with knowledge and experience, leading to potential differences in how 
experienced and inexperienced individuals react to a given disclosure. My findings 
also suggest that other parties (e.g., auditors, lenders, employees within the firm, etc.) 
may be influenced by characteristics affecting the processing fluency of the 
information presented to them.  
 My study adds to the growing body of literature investigating the style of 
disclosures as opposed to their content. Content is the literal meaning of the 
information conveyed, or the concrete facts contained in a disclosure, whereas style 
captures the methods used to convey meaning to the audience (through, for example, 
optimistic vs. pessimistic tone, vividness, vocal cues, etc.). Experiments are well-
suited to studying disclosure style, but research in the area is relatively sparse. At least 
one exception is Hales, Kuang and Venkataraman [2011], which uses an experiment to 
investigate the effects of vivid vs. pallid language, above and beyond actual 
information content. Future experimental research could provide additional evidence 
to complement the archival literature by investigating how specific stylistic choices 
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affect investors’ judgments, and how managers make stylistic choices in the first 
place. 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides background 
information and develops my hypotheses. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 discuss my experiment 
and results, respectively.  Section 1.5 concludes. 
1.2 Background and Development of Hypotheses 
1.2.1 The Effect of Disclosure Readability on Investors 
To address concerns about disclosure readability, the SEC’s Plain English Rule 
(421(d)) went into effect on October 1st, 1998, and requires that issuers adhere to plain 
English principles in the design of firm prospectuses.1 Documentation surrounding the 
rule’s release encourages the use of plain English in all disclosure documents, and 
argues that plain English allows companies to communicate and build relationships 
with their investors (SEC [1998]). More recently, the SEC has expanded plain English 
rules. Rules 13a-20 and 15d-20 were adopted in 2006 and amend the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act to require plain English in disclosures about issues related to corporate 
governance, related-party transactions, executive and director compensation, and 
beneficial ownership. In March of 2009, the SEC began requiring that mutual funds 
provide a plain English summary prospectus of key investment information at the 
                                                 
1 In general, definitions of “readability” in prior literature are imprecise, given that the concept of 
readability has evolved primarily through the evaluation of grade-school textbooks (see Dubay [2004]). 
Some studies use disclosure length as a measure of readability (e.g., Li [2008], You and Zhang [2009], 
Miller [2010], Loughran and McDonald [2011]). Other studies have used measures like the Fog Index 
or Flesch Reading Ease Score (both of which calculate readability based on sentence length and syllable 
counts) (e.g., Li [2008], Biddle, Hilary and Verdi [2009], Miller [2010], Lehavy, Li and Merkley 
[2011], Loughran and McDonald [2011]). However, Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin and Pierce [2009] 
argue for more precise measures of readability in business communications. As a result, my study 
manipulates readability through linguistic and formatting choices, as outlined in the SEC’s Plain 
English Handbook [SEC 1998]. 
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front of their full prospectus.2 In July of 2010, the SEC voted unanimously to amend 
the Investment Advisers Act to require plain English in Form ADV Part 2, the 
narrative brochure that SEC-registered investment advisers are required to provide to 
current and prospective clients.  
 In its Plain English Handbook, the SEC outlines a number of practical 
linguistic and formatting suggestions for preparing plain English disclosures (SEC 
[1998]). Both linguistic and formatting choices can affect the extent to which investors 
find a disclosure to be readable. Linguistic suggestions relate to the choice of words 
and how they are organized. Formatting suggestions relate to the use of features like 
bullet points, tables and line spacing, which increase the legibility of a disclosure (see 
Appendix A for examples).  
 There is evidence in the archival literature to support the idea that disclosure 
readability affects investors. You and Zhang [2009] show that market underreaction to 
10-K filings is more severe as the length of the report (and presumably its complexity) 
increases. Miller [2010] uses linguistic suggestions in the Plain English Handbook to 
develop a measure of 10-K readability, and provides evidence on the relationship 
between enhanced readability of 10-K disclosures and the trading behavior of small 
investors. Miller [2010] finds that more readable disclosures are associated with 
greater trading activity among small investors (defined as those with trades below 
$5000) around the 10-K filing date. This holds even after controlling for information 
content, firm performance and earnings persistence. Miller [2010] also finds that 10-K 
complexity reduces consensus among small investors, but not large investors (defined 
                                                 
2 See Release No. 33-8998. 
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as those with trades above $50,000).3  
 It is possible that the trading volume of small investors is affected by 
disclosure readability because a less readable disclosure limits the amount of 
information that they are willing or able to extract (Grossman and Stiglitz [1980], 
Bloomfield [2002], Hirshleifer and Teoh [2003]). However, I focus on a separate 
effect of readability that is likely to be less intuitive to managers, investors and 
regulators. Research in the psychology literature on processing fluency suggests that 
even if less readable disclosures do not limit investors’ ability to acquire information 
in the first place, disclosure readability can still affect investors’ judgments and 
decisions. More specifically, enhanced processing fluency from a more readable 
disclosure may increase investors’ perceptions that they can rely on the information in 
the disclosure. 
1.2.2 The Role of Processing Fluency 
Processing fluency is subjective, and represents how easy it feels to process 
information. Prior research has manipulated processing fluency in a variety of ways. 
Studies have altered visual processing fluency by manipulating whether materials are 
presented in a difficult- or easy-to-read font (e.g., Haettenschweiler vs. Cambria) or by 
manipulating font size and color (see, e.g., Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz and Simonson 
[2007]). Other studies have manipulated linguistic processing fluency through, for 
example, rhyming (McGlone and Tofighbakhsh [2000]), the use of easy- or hard-to-
pronounce words (Alter and Oppenheimer [2006]) or the use of simple vs. complex 
                                                 
3 Although not the focus of my study, there is also evidence to suggest that disclosure readability affects 
analysts. Lehavy, Li and Merkley [2011] find that firms with less-readable 10-Ks have greater analyst 
following, suggesting that less readable disclosures increase the need for information intermediaries. 
However, less readable disclosures also appear to increase the effort expended by analysts, as measured 
by the time it takes them to provide revised forecasts. Loughran and McDonald [2011] find that less 
readable 10-Ks are associated with greater dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. 
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synonyms (Oppenheimer [2006]).  
Despite the range of techniques that have been used to manipulate processing 
fluency, the corresponding responses from individuals are remarkably similar across 
different settings. In general, individuals like messages that feel easy to process. 
Because individuals act as though feelings experienced while thinking about a target 
bear on the target itself, the feelings of subjective ease associated with processing 
fluency are typically treated as a subconscious cue that something about the message 
or messenger is good. Processing fluency has been associated with higher ratings of 
truth, preference for the message and the messenger, willingness to rely on 
information, and confidence in judgments (see Alter and Oppenheimer [2009] for a 
review).4 For example, McGlone and Tofighbakhsh [2000] find that individuals 
experience higher processing fluency and judge truthfulness to be higher with rhyming 
aphorisms than with informationally-equivalent non-rhyming aphorisms (e.g., “What 
sobriety conceals, alcohol reveals” vs. “What sobriety conceals, alcohol unmasks”). 
Alter and Oppenheimer [2006] find that, in the short term, stocks with names and 
ticker codes that are easier to pronounce outperform those that are more difficult to 
pronounce. 
With respect to disclosure readability and processing fluency, the Plain 
English Handbook suggests that readability affects processing ease by arguing that its 
plain English suggestions correspond with how individuals naturally process 
information (SEC [1998]). Greater readability in a disclosure should therefore increase 
                                                 
4 However there are some exceptions showing that the meaning of processing fluency can be affected 
by context (Schwarz [2004]). Briñol, Petty and Tormala [2006] find that greater processing fluency can 
lead to more negative evaluations if ease is framed negatively. Similarly, Labroo and Kim [2009] find 
that individuals with explicit goals evaluate objects associated with pursuing their goals more 
negatively when they are high in processing fluency, presumably because individuals adopt a heuristic 
belief that achieving something of value will require greater effort (and thus ease is viewed negatively). 
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feelings of processing fluency and increase investors’ beliefs that they can rely on the 
disclosure. Consistent with this prediction, Shah and Oppenheimer [2007] find that 
when both more and less fluent information is presented, individuals weight the more 
fluent information more heavily in their judgments. Similarly, Hafner and Stapel 
[2010] argue that feelings of processing fluency serve as a cue regarding the usability 
of information.   
 If investors increase their reliance on disclosures that are more readable, then 
more readable disclosures should also lead to stronger reactions to the news contained 
in those disclosures. Miller [2010] finds positive associations between disclosure 
readability and the trading behavior of small investors, but also finds that length 
subsumes the effects of readability from the use of plain English. However, archival 
studies are unable to hold constant firm characteristics or the amount of information in 
the disclosure. Thus it is still an open question whether disclosure readability from the 
use of plain English affects small investors above and beyond disclosure length. 
Furthermore, Miller [2010] looks at small investors’ responses to overall readability, 
but does not separately investigate responses to good and bad news. It is important to 
understand how investors react to bad news disclosures that are low in readability 
given prior claims that managers strategically obfuscate negative news [Li 2008].  
In Stage 1 of my experiment, participants receive a single disclosure that 
contains either good or bad news and is either more or less readable. The use of an 
experiment allows me to hold disclosure length and total information constant while 
varying disclosure readability, thereby isolating the effects of disclosure readability on 
small investors’ reactions to both good and bad news. I measure investors’ reactions 
by capturing how their valuation judgments change in response to more or less 
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readable disclosures. My first hypothesis is: 
H1: More readable disclosures lead to more positive changes in 
investors’ valuation judgments when news is good, but more 
negative changes when news is bad.   
As discussed above, I do not expect the stronger reactions to more readable 
disclosures in my study to be driven by differences in the actual information that 
investors acquire from the press release, but instead by how processing fluency 
subconsciously affects their belief that they can rely on the disclosure. Existing 
techniques in the archival literature cannot address processing fluency as a mechanism 
through which readability influences investors. An experiment allows me to elicit 
processing fluency and reliance measures that are not available in archival data. 
Holding disclosure length and information constant, my second hypothesis is: 
H2: More readable disclosures increase investors’ reliance on the 
information in the disclosure, and this effect operates through 
increased feelings of processing fluency. 
Processing fluency from a more readable disclosure may also lead to more 
favorable evaluations of management, even when a disclosure conveys negative news. 
This is consistent with prior literature finding that fluent messages are judged as 
coming from a more likeable or intelligent source (Oppenheimer [2006]). 
Furthermore, if processing fluency from a more readable disclosure increases 
investors’ willingness to rely on the information (Shah and Oppenheimer [2007], 
Hafner and Stapel [2010]), this may carry over to feelings of being able to rely on the 
manager as well.  
Instead of asking for ratings of intelligence, likeability, or willingness to rely 
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on the manager, I focus on attitudes about managers’ credibility in order to be 
consistent with prior work in accounting (see e.g., Mercer [2005], Barton and Mercer 
[2005], Venkataraman [2008], Clor-Proell [2009], Koonce and Lipe [2010], Rupar 
[2011], Tan, Wang and Zhou [2011]).5  H3 focuses on evaluations of management 
credibility, and predicts: 
H3:  Investors’ judgments of management credibility will be higher 
when news is more readable, regardless of whether the 
disclosure conveys good or bad news about the firm. 
 My experiment identifies a circumstance where processing fluency is expected 
to simultaneously decrease one favorability judgment when news is bad (valuation) 
but increase another (management credibility). However, it is also possible that 
processing fluency from more readable negative news, and the resulting negative 
reaction predicted by H1, will carry over into negative impressions of management. 
This could lead to lower evaluations of management credibility when negative news is 
more readable, contrary to my prediction in H3.     
 To date, only a few studies in the accounting literature have relied on theories 
related to processing fluency. Research suggests that fluency feelings can arise from 
processing new, external information, but also from the ease of generating thoughts 
and accessing past memories (Novemsky et al. [2007], Alter and Oppenheimer 
[2009]). In accounting, Sedor [2002] shows that disclosures provided in “scenario 
                                                 
5 As discussed by Mercer [2004], managers’ credibility is distinct from disclosure credibility, although 
the two are related. Substantial work in the archival literature has investigated disclosure credibility, 
particularly with respect to management forecasts. However, these studies typically do not distinguish 
between the credibility of the firm and the credibility of management, or investigate whether managers 
benefit from developing a personal reputation for credibility. One recent exception is Yang [2012], 
which finds that manager-specific forecasting reputations are particularly important when forecast news 
is extreme or analyst dispersion is high. 
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form” (rather than a list) lead to unintentional optimism among analysts. Both Sedor 
[2002] and Kadous, Krische and Sedor [2006] argue that information presented in 
scenario form reduces cognitive effort and facilitates analysts’ ability to envision how 
managers’ plans will be achieved. In turn, the ease of envisioning the means of 
achieving the outcome increases analyst optimism about future performance.6 Kadous 
et al. [2006] show that analyst optimism is reduced when analysts are asked to 
generate few rather than many counter-explanations as to why managers’ plans might 
fail. Drawing on the work of Heiman [1990],  Koonce [1992] and Kennedy [1995] on 
the use of counter-explanations and Schwarz et al. [1991] on the availability heuristic, 
Kadous et al. [2006] argue that their results are driven by the fact that analysts find the 
generation of few counter-explanations to be subjectively easy, but the generation of 
many counter-explanations to be difficult. This subjective ease (or processing fluency) 
serves as a heuristic cue affecting judgments. A more recent paper by Koonce and 
Lipe [2010] also touches on theories of processing fluency, but in a different context. 
They find that when information about both earnings trend and earnings performance 
is available, investors react to each measure only when it is consistent over time (e.g., 
consistently increasing earnings or consistently meeting performance benchmarks). 
Koonce and Lipe [2010] argue that inconsistent measures are more difficult to process, 
and are therefore ignored when consistent information is available. 
1.3 Experiment 
1.3.1 Participants 
Participants are 234 individuals recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
                                                 
6 Sedor [2002] emphasizes the effects of connecting ideas in a causal narrative, whereas my study holds 
constant the causal narrative that is actually provided by managers, but manipulates how easy it is to 
process the story that it conveyed.   
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platform in exchange for $0.75. Launched in 2005, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(AMT) is an internet labor market that allows “Requesters” to pay individuals to 
complete “Human Intelligence Tasks” (HITs). AMT is an increasingly popular source 
of experimental data for social scientists because the AMT subject pool is large, 
readily accessible, and at least as representative of the U.S. population as more 
traditional subject pools (Paolacci, Chandler and Ipeirotis [2010]). Furthermore, 
studies run on AMT have been shown to reliably replicate a wide range of prior JDM 
findings (Paolacci et al. [2010], Horton, Rand and Zeckhauser [2011]). Most 
participants take approximately 12 minutes to complete the study, meaning that their 
effective hourly wage for participating is $3.75/hour. This is well above the median 
reservation wage reported in Horton and Chilton [2010] of approximately $1.38/hour. 
These relatively low wages highlight the fact that laboratory experiments are more 
costly to run than online experiments in part because participants demand additional 
compensation for physically showing up to the lab (Bloomfield and Rennekamp 
[2009]). 
 Libby, Bloomfield and Nelson [2002] suggest that the appropriateness of a 
particular group of participants can be judged based on whether their knowledge is 
sufficient for the task. As a baseline requirement, I specifically recruit participants 
who (1) live in the United States and (2) consider English to be their native language. I 
collect additional background information on participants to support their use in my 
experiment. The average participant is 34.13 years old, with an average of 13.29 years 
of full-time work experience. Participants have completed an average of 1.23 
accounting and 1.12 finance courses. Overall, 89.74% of participants indicate that they 
have at least some experience with investing, with 45.73% saying that they have 
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invested in individual stocks in the past and 66.24% saying that they plan on investing 
in individual stocks in the future.7 This particular sample of participants should have 
sufficient knowledge to act as small investors, read a press release and provide simple 
judgments of a firm and its management.8  
My focus on small investors is appropriate because Miller [2010] finds that 
small (but not large) investors are influenced by the readability of disclosures. 
Furthermore, the SEC emphasizes that clear writing is primarily intended to assist the 
“least-sophisticated investors” (SEC [1998]). Figure 1 presents the sources that 
participants indicate using for their investment information. The most common source 
of investment information (with 43.59% of participants indicating it as a source) is 
company websites. This suggests that companies may have a substantial amount of 
control over the presentation of at least some of the information that is accessed by the 
investing public. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Elliott, Hodge, Kennedy and Pronk [2007] investigate whether, and when, MBA students are 
appropriate proxies for nonprofessional investors. They conclude that first-year MBA students are 
appropriate for tasks that are low in integrative complexity and require little specialized knowledge. My 
participants have demographic characteristics similar to the first-year MBA students used in Elliott et 
al.’s [2007] studies. The “early-MBA” participants from their first (second) experiment have an average 
of 5.2 (5.8) years of full-time work experience, have completed an average of 1.8 (1.6) accounting 
courses, 1.0 (0.6) finance courses, and 52% (52%) have invested in individual stocks or debt securities 
in the past.  
8 AMT provides additional quality-control features beyond allowing researchers to screen for certain 
types of participants. For instance, unique worker ID’s associated with each HIT and the collection of 
IP addresses mitigates the likelihood that participants complete the task more than once. I confirm that 
none of the 234 participants in my study have identical IP addresses or worker ID’s. Researchers also 
have the ability to deny payment to participants for poor quality work (such as failing too many 
attention checks). Thus, AMT overcomes some of the potential concerns with conducting accounting 
experiments online that are raised by Bloomfield and Rennekamp [2009].  
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Figure 1. Sources of Financial Information for Participants 
 
1.3.2 Design 
My experiment uses a 2x2 between-subjects design manipulating whether an 
abbreviated press release for a fictitious soft drink company (1) conveys good or bad 
news about the firm, and (2) is more or less readable (see Figure 2). The experiment is 
conducted in two stages (see Figure 3). In Stage 1, participants receive a single initial 
press release. In Stage 2, participants have access to the initial press release but also 
receive another press release (conveying the same news), but at the other level of 
disclosure readability. They are told to consider this second press release as an 
alternative way in which the firm could have presented the information, making salient 
the potential for variation in disclosure readability.   
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Figure 2. 2x2 Between-Subjects Design 
 
 
Figure 3. Timeline of Events in Stages 1 and 2 of the Experiment 
 
1.3.3 Manipulations 
Materials are adapted from those of a real soft drink company (Jones Soda) but 
are disguised in order to ensure that participants respond to my experimental materials 
rather than to other factors (for example, the reputation of the actual firm).  
 To manipulate readability, I start by considering the linguistic and formatting 
suggestions made in the SEC’s Plain English Handbook [SEC 1998]. I then pick the 
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features that can be varied without changing information content.9 My more readable 
disclosures conform to the SEC’s suggestions for the chosen features, whereas my less 
readable disclosures violate the SEC’s suggestions. The specific linguistic features I 
manipulate are the use of short sentences; active voice; no hidden verbs; no 
superfluous words; language written in the positive; simple synonyms; personal 
pronouns; and sentences that keep ‘subject’, ‘verb’ and ‘object’ close together. The 
formatting features I manipulate are the use of clear headings/hierarchy; appropriate 
layout; tables; and bullet points. Panels A and B of Appendix A provide examples of 
the types of linguistic and formatting suggestions, respectively, that I use in my 
readability manipulations.  
 To manipulate news I hold revenue and net profit for the firm constant, but 
change performance in the same quarter for the prior year to alter whether the current 
quarter represents better (good news) or worse (bad news) performance. I also change 
the language in the disclosure where appropriate, so that the good news (bad news) 
disclosures discuss increases (decreases) in performance for the quarter and 
expectations of further improvement (deterioration) for the upcoming quarter and 
annual results. Panels A and B of Appendix B provide examples of the abbreviated 
press releases provided in my more readable conditions for good and bad news, 
respectively. Appendix C provides similar examples for my less readable conditions. 
1.3.4 Task and Procedure 
In Stage 1 of my experiment, participants begin by reading background 
information about the company and providing an initial judgment about the 
                                                 
9 Concrete Language and Jargon/Legalese are not included in my readability manipulation because they 
are difficult to manipulate without changing the information provided to participants. 
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appropriate common stock valuation for the firm. Following initial valuation 
judgments, participants are randomly presented with one of the four abbreviated press 
releases that contain my manipulations (see Appendices B and C). After participants 
review the press release, I ask them to indicate once again their beliefs about the 
appropriate common stock valuation of the firm, as well as provide their ratings of 
management competence and trustworthiness (the two components of credibility used 
in testing H3).10 After answering questions about firm valuation and management 
credibility, participants indicate the extent to which they felt that they could rely on 
the information in the press release and also provide ratings of their feelings about 
disclosure readability to capture processing fluency. Again, H2 predicts that a more 
readable disclosure will lead to higher ratings of processing fluency which, in turn, 
will increase participants’ beliefs that they can rely on the information in the 
disclosure. Participants conclude Stage 1 of the task by answering three multiple-
choice questions about the information in the press release. These are designed to rule 
out that differences in participants’ responses are due to differences in information 
acquisition rather than differences in subjective perceptions associated with 
information processing.  
 In Stage 2 of my experiment, participants are told that they will also be asked 
to consider another press release that management could have provided (in addition to 
the one that they initially received). The second press release that they receive 
contains the same news (good or bad), but is presented at the other level of readability. 
This presentation is intended to make salient to participants that managers can vary the 
                                                 
10 I randomly assign participants to evaluate either firm valuation or management credibility first. 
Ordering of questions does not interact with other manipulations to influence my dependent variables, 
and is therefore not discussed further. 
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level of readability in their disclosures. To reinforce the difference between the two 
press releases and increase the likelihood that participants carefully examine them, 
participants rate the extent to which the actual information in the two disclosures is 
identical, rate which of the two disclosures is more readable, and indicate the extent to 
which they think management is more likely to choose one press release versus the 
other if the goal is to elicit a favorable reaction from the market.  
 In Stage 2 of the experiment, participants provide new valuation, competence 
and trustworthiness judgments on the same scales as in Stage 1. These judgments 
allow me to provide some supplemental evidence on whether responses in Stage 1 of 
the experiment appear to be intentional (that is, before the potential for variation in 
disclosure readability is made salient). Prior papers have successfully used similar 
designs to disentangle unintentional biases from intentional judgments (see Libby, 
Bloomfield and Nelson [2002] for a discussion). 
1.3.5 Primary Dependent Variables 
Change in Valuation Judgments. Following prior literature, I elicit valuation 
judgments by asking participants to indicate on a 101-point scale what they believe to 
be an appropriate common stock valuation for the firm, ranging from 0 = low to 100 = 
high (Koonce and Lipe [2010]). Recall that participants make a valuation judgment 
both before and after viewing the press release containing my manipulations. The 
actual measure I analyze in testing H1 is the difference between these two valuation 
judgments. This change measure captures the strength of investors’ reactions to the 
disclosure.  
 Reliance on the Disclosure. I measure reliance through a direct question 
asking participants to indicate their agreement with the statement “I felt like I could 
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rely on the information in the press release” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
agree). I also investigate a measure that should reflect reliance, although it is likely to 
be a noisier proxy. My second measure of reliance is the absolute value of the change 
in valuation judgments discussed above. Greater reliance should be reflected as a 
larger value on this measure. I use both of these measures to provide evidence on H2. 
 Processing Fluency. To measure processing fluency, participants are asked 
how easy or difficult it felt to read the press release that they received (1 = very 
difficult, 7 = very easy). My measure therefore captures participants’ subjective 
feelings, and this measure serves as the mediating variable in my process analysis 
related to H2 (Oppenheimer [2006]).  
 Management Credibility. I use 101-point scales to capture participants’ 
judgments about the competence and trustworthiness of management, where 0 = very 
incompetent or very untrustworthy, and 100 = very competent or very trustworthy 
(Koonce and Lipe [2010]). Consistent with prior studies, I collapse these two ratings 
into a single measure of management credibility for testing H3. 
1.4 Results 
1.4.1 Effects of Readability on Valuation Judgments 
My expectation from H1 is that more readable disclosures lead to more 
positive changes in valuation judgments when news is good, but more negative 
changes in valuation judgments when news is bad. Descriptive statistics (means, 
standard deviations and medians) are presented in Panel A of Table 1 for my variable 
capturing changes in valuation judgments.11   
                                                 
11 Throughout Section 1.4, results are presented based on 234 participants. Originally 250 participants 
were recruited. Of the 250 participants that completed the task through AMT, 15 erroneously 
participated even though they were not native English speakers, as requested in my recruiting materials. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Analysis of Variance –Valuation Judgments 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics - Mean, (Standard Deviation), and [Median]
News Less More Overall
Good 18.153 23.500 20.893
(12.635) (13.345) (13.225)
[20.000] [22.000] [20.000]
n=59 n=62 n=121
Bad -10.259 -14.431 -12.420
(11.371) (14.357) (13.113)
[-11.000] [-15.000] [-13.500]
n=54 n=58 n=112
Overall 4.575 5.167
(18.630) (23.502)
[10.000] [10.500]
n=113 n=120
Panel B. Change in Valuation Judgments - Contrast-Coded Analysis of Variance
Source S.S. d.f. M.S. F-statistic p-value
News x Readability 65829.425 1 65829.425 389.295 <0.001
Residual 65.485 2 32.743 0.194 0.824
Error 38723.720 229 169.099
Panel C. Change in Valuation Judgments - Simple Main Effects of Readability
Source S.S. d.f. M.S. F-statistic p-value
Good News 864.476 1 864.476 5.112 0.012
Bad News 486.682 1 486.682 2.878 0.046
Readability
 
Notes to Table 1. This table presents descriptive statistics, contrast-coded ANOVA, 
and simple main effects tests for changes in investors’ valuation judgments after 
viewing a disclosure. The cells of the experiment receive contrast weights as follows: 
Good News/More Readable = +3, Bad News/More Readable = -3, Good News/Less 
Readable = +2, Bad News/Less Readable = -2. All p-values are one-tailed equivalents 
                                                                                                                                            
One additional participant is excluded because a glitch in the Qualtrics software used to administer the 
task failed to show the page containing my manipulated press release. Finally, one participant provided 
credibility judgments but not valuation judgments, and is therefore excluded from the tests involving 
valuation judgments. 
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given my directional predictions, with the exception of the residual reported in Panel 
B.  
 
 
To test my predicted interaction, I derive contrast weights using the procedure 
outlined in Buckless and Ravenscroft [1990]. The specific contrast weights are as 
follows: +2 in the Good News/Less Readable Condition, -2 in the Bad News/Less 
Readable Condition, +3 in the Good News/More Readable Condition, and –3 in the 
Bad News/More Readable Condition. The first two contrast weights reflect that I 
expect a relatively strong main effect of good vs. bad news, even at low levels of 
readability. The third and fourth weights reflect that I expect more readable 
disclosures to cause changes in valuation judgments to be larger than their less 
readable counterparts in the same news condition. Results of this planned contrast are 
presented in Panel B of Table 1.12 As expected, I find support for my predicted 
interaction (p<0.001, one-tailed).13 Figure 4 presents the plot of the interaction 
between news and readability. I also confirm that readability has the predicted effect 
for both good and bad news by conducting tests of simple main effects. Panel C of 
Table 1 shows that when news is good (bad), a more readable disclosure leads to 
significantly more positive (negative) changes in valuation judgments (p=0.012 and 
0.046, respectively, both one-tailed).14 
                                                 
12 The interaction of news with readability is also significant without planned contrast weights 
(p=0.003, one-tailed), or with alternative contrast weights reflecting the (1) main effect of news and (2) 
the predicted interaction. 
13 All p-values for analyses using F-statistics to test directional predictions are reported as one-tailed 
equivalents. 
14 The normality assumption is violated in three of the four cells of my design for the variable capturing 
changes in valuation, but my large sample size (n>54 in each treatment) suggests that parametric tests 
are robust to this deviation from the normality assumption (Scheffé [1959]). Furthermore, performing 
Levene’s test fails to reject the assumption of homogeneity of variance (p=0.579). Therefore, for my 
analyses of changes in valuation judgments I focus on means and perform parametric tests.  However, 
inferences are the same when I use the nonparametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum test. When news is good, a 
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Figure 4. Plot of News x Readability Interaction on Change in Valuation 
Judgments – Stage 1 
 
 To verify that the stronger reactions to more readable disclosures are not 
driven by differences in information acquisition, participants respond to three 
multiple-choice questions about the press release. These questions are designed to be 
somewhat difficult in order to ensure that differences in information acquisition can be 
detected. I ask them to respond to questions asking them (1) by how much the firm’s 
revenues changed in the quarter compared to the same quarter in the prior year, (2) 
whether the CEO expected deteriorating, improving, or steady performance in the 
upcoming quarter and annual results, and (3) to name the two countries in which the 
firm primarily operates. The first two questions are designed to detect whether 
                                                                                                                                            
more readable disclosure leads to significantly more positive changes in valuation judgments (Z=2.33, 
p=0.010, one-tailed). When news is bad, a more readable disclosure leads to significantly more negative 
changes in valuation judgments (Z=1.86, p=0.031, one-tailed). 
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participants have acquired information about the firm’s past performance and future 
expectations, both of which may be particularly relevant to making valuation 
judgments. The last question is designed to detect whether they attended to the 
detailed information about the firm. There are no significant differences in the overall 
proportion of responses that are correct across the four conditions (p=0.539, two-
tailed). This supports the claim that a more readable disclosure does not lead to greater 
information acquisition in my experiment, and therefore suggests that reactions to 
actual differences in participants’ information are not driving my results.15 For the first 
two questions, the proportion of participants answering correctly is 73.93% and 
82.91%, respectively. For the last question, 98.72% of participants correctly identify at 
least one of the two countries in which the firm operates, while 84.19% successfully 
identify both countries.16 
1.4.2 Effects of Readability on Processing Fluency and Reliance on a Disclosure 
H2 predicts that a more readable disclosure will increase feelings of processing 
fluency and, in turn, increase investors’ beliefs that they can rely on the disclosure. As 
discussed in Section 1.3.5, I measure reliance in two ways. Panel A of Figure 5 
summarizes results of a mediation analysis using my first measure of reliance. The 
mediation analysis is conducted according to the 4-step procedure specified by Baron 
and Kenny [1986]. In this analysis, the dependent variable is participants’ agreement 
                                                 
15 Responses in Stage 2 further support the claim that differences in information acquisition are not 
driving my results. Participants who received the less readable disclosures in Stage 1 did not revise their 
valuation judgments in Stage 2, suggesting that they did not feel as though the more readable disclosure 
provided in Stage 2 gave them access to additional information. 
16 For the individual questions, the only difference detected is that participants are more likely to answer 
the second question correctly with a more readable disclosure. However, this difference only occurs for 
bad news (p=0.036, one-tailed) rather than good news (p=0.481, one-tailed), so it cannot explain the 
good news results. Furthermore, if I analyze only those participants that answer the second question 
correctly, my contrast testing H1 is still significant (p<0.001), as are the main effects for good news 
(p=0.021, one-tailed) and bad news (p=0.020, one-tailed). 
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with the statement “I felt like I could rely on the information in the press release” (1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). With respect to Step 1, readability is 
significantly positively associated with participants’ beliefs that they can rely on the 
press release (p=0.039, one-tailed). Step 2 confirms that readability is significantly 
positively associated with participants’ perceptions of processing fluency (p<0.001, 
one-tailed). Step 3 confirms that the mediating variable, processing fluency, is 
significantly associated with participants’ reliance on the press release, even after 
controlling for readability (p<0.001, one-tailed). Finally, Step 4 confirms that 
processing fluency fully mediates the relationship between readability and 
participants’ beliefs that they can rely on the press release, as the effect of readability 
on reliance is no longer significant when included in the model with processing 
fluency (p=0.431, one-tailed). 
 Panel B of Figure 5 presents the mediation analysis for H2 with a different 
measure of reliance as the dependent variable: the unsigned measure capturing the 
change in valuation judgments. While noisier than a direct measure of reliance, the 
unsigned measure reflects that changes in valuation judgments should be larger (as 
demonstrated in H1) if reliance on a disclosure is greater. Step 1 confirms that 
readability is significantly positively associated with participants’ reliance on the press 
release (p<0.001, one-tailed). Step 2 again confirms that readability is significantly 
positively associated with participants’ perceptions of processing fluency (p<0.001, 
one-tailed). Step 3 confirms that processing fluency is significantly associated with 
participants’ reliance on the press release, after controlling for disclosure readability 
(p=0.016, one-tailed). Finally, Step 4 supports partial mediation. Readability is still 
significant, but the significance is reduced when processing fluency is included in the 
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regression (<0.001 to 0.003). I use the Sobel test to confirm that the direct effect is 
reduced between Steps 1 and 4 (that is, once the mediator is included (p=0.032, one-
tailed)). Results in Figure 5 support H2 and show that a more readable disclosure 
increases participants’ perceptions that they can rely on the information in the 
disclosure, as a result of increased processing fluency. 
 
Figure 5. Mediation Analyses for testing H2 
Panel A. Beliefs about Ability to Rely on the Disclosure as the Dependent 
Variable 
 
Panel B. Unsigned Change in Valuation Judgments as the Dependent Variable 
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1.4.3 Effects of Readability on Judgments of Management Credibility 
To test H3, I begin by confirming that the trustworthiness and competence 
responses represent the same underlying credibility construct by performing a 
reliability analysis. The resulting Cronbach’s alpha is 0.78, which exceeds the 
recommended threshold of 0.70 (Nunnally [1978]). Therefore, I combine participants’ 
judgments of management trustworthiness and competence into one management 
credibility measure by averaging the two responses. Panel A of Table 2 presents 
descriptive statistics for the credibility measure. Panel B presents results of two-
sample t-tests of the main effect of readability on credibility. However, the effect is 
not significant for the full sample (p=0.299, one-tailed)  or in either the good news 
(p=0.141, one-tailed) or bad news (p=0.531, one-tailed) subsamples. Thus, the effect 
predicted in H3 is not supported, and press releases that are more readable do not 
directly lead to higher ratings of management credibility. Furthermore, there are no 
significant effects of readability on either the management competence or 
management trustworthiness judgments when analyzed separately. 
A contemporaneous working paper by Tan et al. [2011] may help to explain 
why I do not find a direct effect of readability on credibility. Tan et al. [2011] focus on 
the credibility-enhancing role of disclosure readability, but in a setting where their 
experimental manipulations affect the likelihood that investors spontaneously consider 
that managers might choose levels of disclosure readability strategically. The authors 
find that disclosure readability has a stronger effect on credibility judgments when a 
disclosure contains inconsistent information about a firm’s performance (e.g., 
favorable information in the opening paragraphs of the disclosure, but disappointing 
news in a latter paragraph). Tan et al. [2011] argue that this occurs because the 
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inconsistent performance information makes investors more sensitive to managers’ 
reporting incentives, so that investors’ judgments of disclosure credibility are higher 
(lower) when managers make the incentive-inconsistent (incentive-consistent) 
decision to provide a more (less) readable disclosure. In my study, the press releases 
provided to participants convey primarily either good or bad news, and do not contain 
stark inconsistencies that might specifically trigger strong concerns about credibility. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Two-Sample T-Tests – Credibility Judgments 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics - Mean, (Standard Deviation), and [Median] 
 
Readability 
   News Less More Overall 
  Good 77.415 79.806 78.640 
  
 
(13.481) (10.800) (12.189) 
  
 
[80.500] [80.750] [80.500] 
  
 
n=59 n=62 n=121 
  
      Bad 61.418 61.198 61.305 
  
 
(13.688) (16.329) (15.035) 
  
 
[61.000] [60.750] [61.000] 
  
 
n=55 n=58 n=113 
  
      Overall 69.697 70.813 
   
 
(15.725) (16.574) 
   
 
[70.000] [72.500] 
     n=114 n=120   
  
      Panel B. Credibility Judgments - Two-Sample T-Tests 
            
 
Sample 
Difference Between 
More and Less 
Readable t-statistic p-value 
 Full Sample 1.116 0.528 0.299 
 Good News  2.391 1.079 0.141 
 Bad News -0.220 -0.078 0.531 
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Notes to Table 2. Panel A presents descriptive statistics on the credibility measure in 
my experiment, in which 234 participants read a press release and provide associated 
competence and trustworthiness judgments on a 101-point scale (0=low, 100=high). 
Credibility is measured as the average of the Trustworthiness and Competence 
judgments after Cronbach’s alpha confirms that the two measures are capturing the 
same underlying construct. Panel B presents results for testing the effects of 
readability on credibility in the full sample as well as the good and bad news 
subsamples. All p-values are one-tailed given my directional predictions. 
 
 
I do, however, find evidence that readability has an indirect effect on 
management credibility through its influence on processing fluency. Hayes [2009] 
cautions that failure to test for an indirect effect in the absence of a direct or total 
effect may cause researchers to miss “potentially interesting, important or useful 
mechanisms by which [the independent variable] exerts some kind of effect on [the 
dependent variable].” Others have pointed out that an indirect effect can be established 
even if the direct or total effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable 
is not significant (Kenny, Kashy and Bolger [1998], MacKinnon et al. [2000]; Shrout 
and Bolger [2002], Zhao et al. [2010]).  
Following the advice of Zhao et al. [2010], I use a bootstrap analysis to test 
whether readability indirectly increases judgments of management credibility through 
increased feelings of processing fluency. The bootstrapping method generates an 
empirical sampling distribution of the indirect effect and generates a confidence 
interval for its value. Drawing a bootstrap sample of N=5000, I find that the mean 
indirect effect is positive (mean = 1.553, untabulated), with a 99% confidence interval 
excluding zero (0.135 to 3.727, untabulated). My analysis also separately confirms the 
significance of the two components of the indirect effect: readability increases feelings 
of processing fluency (p<0.001, one-tailed, untabulated), and feelings of processing 
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fluency increase judgments of management credibility (p=0.001, one-tailed, 
untabulated). A significant indirect effect in the absence of a direct or total effect 
could mean that that there are one or more effects that work in the opposite direction 
of fluency (MacKinnon et al. [2000], Shrout and Bolger [2002] Zhao et al. [2010]). 
For example, more readable bad news may lead to lower credibility assessments 
through an alternative indirect path, offsetting the positive effects of fluency and 
canceling out the direct effect, should it exist. Alternatively, an indirect effect in the 
absence of a significant direct or total effect could also mean that a moderate direct 
effect exists but is not detectable without a larger sample size (Shrout and Bolger 
[2002]). 
Finally, to provide some evidence on the potential economic consequences of 
management credibility judgments, I investigate their relationship with participants’ 
valuation judgments used in testing H1. I find that the correlation between valuation 
judgments and judgments of management credibility is positive and significant 
(ρ=0.561, p<0.001, untabulated). Furthermore, if I run the ANOVA testing for a News 
x Readability interaction again but add credibility as a covariate, the effect of 
credibility judgments on valuation judgments is positive and significant (t=4.413, 
p<0.001, untabulated), and the News x Readability interaction remains significant as 
well. 
1.4.4 Supplemental Analyses 
 Stage 2 of my experiment presents participants with both the more and less 
readable press releases simultaneously for their performance condition (i.e., good or 
bad news), and asks them to respond to a variety of questions, as described in Section 
1.3. Of particular interest in Stage 2 is that participants provide new valuation 
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judgments (on the same 101-point scales as in Stage 1). This allows a test of whether 
and how the responses documented in testing H1 differ once it is made salient that 
disclosure readability can vary.17   
Panel A of Table 3 presents, by condition, the mean difference between Stage 
2 valuation judgments and judgments made in Stage 1 after viewing the press release. 
I find that participants in the good news condition with a more readable disclosure 
provide valuation judgments in Stage 2 that are significantly lower than their valuation 
judgments in Stage 1 (p=0.095, two-tailed).18 At the same time, participants in the bad 
news condition with a more readable disclosure provide valuation judgments in Stage 
2 that are significantly higher than their valuation judgments in Stage 1 (p<0.001, two-
tailed). Participants who initially received less readable disclosures (good or bad 
news), do not provide valuation judgments in Stage 2 that significantly differ from 
their valuation judgments in Stage 1 (both p-values are greater than 0.212, two-tailed).  
Similar to the measure of participants’ reactions used in testing H1, I also 
calculate a measure for each participant of the difference between valuation judgments 
made in Stage 2 and initial valuation judgments made at the beginning of Stage 1 (i.e., 
before receiving the press release). Analyzing this measure shows that there is no 
significant difference between reactions to more and less readable disclosures for 
either good news (p=0.723, two-tailed) or bad news (p=0.112, two-tailed) (see Panel B 
of Table 3). Figure 6 presents the plot of this measure, by condition. Comparing 
Figure 4 to Figure 6 shows how participants’ valuation judgments differ depending on 
                                                 
17 As described in Section 1.3, participants also provide new credibility judgments on the same 101-
point scales as in Stage 1. However, I do not compare Stage 1 and Stage 2 credibility judgments due to 
the lack of a significant effect in testing H3. 
18 All p-values presented in the supplemental analyses are two-tailed, given that I make no ex ante 
directional predictions. 
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whether they are elicited either before or after participants are explicitly made aware 
of the potential for variation in disclosure readability. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics, T-Tests and Tests for Simple Main Effects of 
Readability on Stage 2 Valuation Judgments 
Panel A. Tests of Whether Participants Change Valuation Judgments between Stages 1 and 2
Mean 
Change t-statistic p-value
Good News - High Readability -2.261 -1.698 0.095
Good News - Low Readability 1.336 1.183 0.212
Bad News - High Readability 8.410 3.787 <0.001
Bad News - Low Readability -1.306 -0.704 0.485
Panel B. Simple Main Effects of Readability on Stage 2 Valuation Judgments
Source S.S. d.f. M.S. F-statistic p-value
Good News 25.059 1 25.059 0.126 0.723
Bad News 495.143 1 495.143 2.483 0.116
Condition Change (if any)
Significant increase.
No change.
Significant decrease.
No change.
 
Notes to Table 3. This table presents descriptive statistics, t-tests, and simple main 
effects tests for the measures used in my supplemental analyses to examine investors’ 
valuation judgments after they explicitly consider the potential for variation in 
disclosure readability. Panel A presents the mean change, by condition, between the 
Stage 1 valuation judgments made after receiving the press release and the Stage 2 
valuation judgments.  Panel B presents results of testing for simple main effects of 
readability on valuation judgments in Stage 2, for both the good and bad news 
conditions. All p-values in Table 3 are two-tailed given that I have no ex ante 
directional predictions. 
 
 
 
This pattern of revised valuation judgments suggests that the stronger reactions 
to more readable disclosures found in H1 may be unintentional (Kahneman and 
Tversky [1996], Tan, Libby, and Hunton [2002]). This is also consistent with findings 
in psychology showing that people are not affected by processing fluency once they 
realize its source (Schwarz [2004], Alter and Oppenheimer [2009]). An alternative 
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possibility is that participants are not revising their valuation judgments to correct for 
overreaction to a more readable disclosure, but are instead revising their judgments in 
response to consideration of managers’ strategic readability choices. Unfortunately, it 
is difficult to make investors aware of the potential for variation in disclosure 
readability without also making them aware of managers’ role in that variation (and 
therefore the potential for strategic behavior). As a result, I cannot clearly disentangle 
these two possibilities, and Stage 2 valuation judgments should be interpreted with 
caution. However, I believe that the results support a “correction for overreaction” 
explanation more than a “reaction to managers’ strategic behavior” explanation. 
Correction for overreaction would more clearly predict that participants in the more 
readable conditions would revise their valuation judgments to be less extreme (as I 
observe). If participants are instead reacting to consideration of managers’ strategic 
behavior, I would predict that participants would revise their valuation judgments in 
the two conditions where levels of readability were more consistent with managers’ 
incentives. More specifically, I would expect those who are in the less readable/bad 
news condition and the more readable/good news condition to both revise their 
valuation judgments downward (a pattern which I do not observe). 
 
 
 36 
 
Figure 6. Plot of News x Readability Interaction on Change in Valuation 
Judgments – Stage 2 
 
 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
Recent work in the archival accounting literature investigates disclosure 
readability (Li [2008], You and Zhang [2009]) and its effects on the behavior of small 
investors (Miller [2010]). I use a controlled experiment to provide complementary 
evidence and to address questions that cannot be answered with archival data. I find 
that, holding constant length and information content, more readable disclosures lead 
to stronger reactions from investors, so that changes in investors’ valuation judgments 
are more positive when news is good and more negative when news is bad. Consistent 
with prior literature in psychology, I find that participants are more likely to feel as 
though they can rely on a disclosure that is more readable, and that this effect is 
mediated by processing fluency. This greater reliance on news (be it good or bad) 
helps to explain the stronger reactions to more readable disclosures that I observe, 
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even though readability does not lead to significant differences in the actual 
information that participants are able to gather from the press release. Counter to my 
predictions, I do not find that disclosure readability directly affects perceptions of 
management credibility. However, I do find evidence that readability has a positive 
and significant indirect effect on management credibility, and that this indirect effect 
operates through increased feelings of processing fluency.  
 In Stage 2 of my experiment, I find that participants who initially received the 
more readable disclosures provide valuation judgments in Stage 2 that are less extreme 
than the valuation judgments they provide in Stage 1, to the point where the effect of 
readability on investors’ reactions  is no longer significant. These results suggest that 
the stronger reactions in response to more readable disclosures in Stage 1 of my 
experiment may have been unintentional (Kahneman and Tversky [1996], Tan, Libby 
and Hunton [2002]). This is consistent with prior research showing that individuals do 
not treat processing fluency as a cue in their judgments once they realize its source 
(Schwarz [2004], Alter and Oppenheimer [2009]). This result has potentially 
important implications for the SEC’s push towards improving disclosure readability. 
While the SEC describes more readable disclosures as though they are unambiguously 
positive [SEC 1998], my results indicate that more readable disclosures may actually 
lead investors to overreact to information, particularly those who are the least 
sophisticated. In other words, investors may be too quick to accept information that is 
presented in a way that is easy to process. This suggests that the benefits of more 
readable disclosures may be less clear-cut than has been argued by the SEC [SEC 
1998] and in prior accounting literature (e.g., Li [2008], You and Zhang [2009], Miller 
[2010]). 
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  My findings add to the growing body of literature investigating the style of 
disclosures as opposed to their content. Content is the literal meaning of the 
information conveyed, or the concrete facts contained in a disclosure, whereas style 
captures the methods used to convey meaning to the audience. In response to Core’s 
[2001] call for greater computational linguistic processing of qualitative disclosures, 
stylistic factors besides readability have been investigated in the archival literature, 
including certainty (Demers and Vega [2010]), numerical intensity (Henry [2008]), 
boilerplate vs. meaningful language (Nelson and Pritchard [2007]), and tone (Henry 
[2008], Davis, Piger and Sedor [2011], Davis and Tama-Sweet [2011], Feldman, 
Govindaraj, Livnat and Segal [2009], Li [2010a], Demers and Vega [2010], Rogers, 
Van Buskirk and Zechman [2011]). However, experimental investigation of stylistic 
characteristics is relatively scarce in the recent accounting literature. One exception is 
Hales et al. [2011], which investigates the effects of vivid vs. pallid language, above 
and beyond actual information content. Other recent work has looked at the 
determinants of the style characteristics of verbal communications (Hobson, Mayew 
and Venkatachalam [2011]), as well as reactions to verbal communications (Mayew 
and Venkatachalam [2012], Elliott, Hodge and Sedor [2012]).   
 A limitation of my study is that it is not clear whether investors’ reactions 
differ in response to individual linguistic and formatting choices. I made this design 
choice to produce a strong treatment effect. My treatments also correspond with real-
world disclosures, because the use of either high- or low-quality linguistic and 
formatting features is likely to be highly correlated in a given disclosure. However, 
there is substantial opportunity for future experimental research investigating how 
individual stylistic features of a disclosure affect investors’ judgments. Experiments 
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are also likely to be well-suited to the investigation of managers’ disclosure decisions 
(to investors, but also to auditors, other employees, clients, etc.). Sociolinguistics 
research supports the prediction that choice of linguistic characteristics may vary in 
line with specific goals and incentives.19 Based on these findings, future work might 
investigate whether managers intentionally or unintentionally use personal pronouns 
and other linguistic features to influence others’ reactions as firm performance and 
incentives vary (Chatterjee and Hambrick [2007], Li [2010b]). 
 My study also adds to the literature on processing fluency, and suggests that it 
may be an important mechanism for both understanding results in prior studies and 
motivating predictions in future research. While processing fluency is mentioned only 
rarely in the existing accounting literature (e.g., Koonce and Lipe [2010]), a number of 
prior findings are consistent with outcomes that would be predicted by research on 
processing fluency. In their review, Alter and Oppenheimer [2009] point out that all 
tasks range from effortless to demanding, and that there are a number of sources of 
processing fluency in a given task. As a result, processing fluency effects are likely to 
be pervasive across accounting settings. The availability of information, or ease of 
retrieval, is just one manifestation of processing fluency (Alter and Oppenheimer 
[2009]). Thus, accounting studies showing that professional and nonprofessional 
investors do not spontaneously recall or consider unfavorable information about a firm 
shed light on how processing fluency might affect investor behavior (e.g., Kadous et 
al. [2006], Krische [2005]). Similarly, conceptual processing fluency relates to the 
ease with which individuals access relevant (and sometimes irrelevant) knowledge 
                                                 
19 For example, Gunsch, Brownlow, Haynes and Mabe [2000] investigate how personal pronouns and 
present/future tense verbs appear to be strategically used in political ads to focus voters on a positive 
future relationship with candidates. Negative ads tend to emphasize negative past behaviors of the 
opponent and frame him or her as distant. 
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structures to complete a task (Schwarz [2004]). Findings in Hopkins [1996] can 
perhaps then be thought of as evidence that financial statement classification affects 
conceptual processing fluency by making category-relevant information more or less 
accessible.  
 The effects of processing fluency also represent a potentially fruitful 
opportunity for future research. For instance, the use of “jargon” is likely to feel more 
fluent to those with more experience in financial reporting settings, suggesting 
important experience effects of processing fluency. Furthermore, processing fluency 
research might also suggest potential remedies for biased decision-making in 
accounting settings. Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley and Eyre [2007] show that in some 
circumstances disfluent presentation can lead to more systematic processing, 
presumably because disfluency can act as a signal that greater effort should be 
expended on the task. This suggests that processing fluency could be manipulated in a 
variety of ways to induce relatively more cautious or aggressive behavior among 
managers, investors, auditors, etc. 
 Finally, my study uses a source of participants that may prove useful for future 
research. The AMT platform provides access to more participants than would typically 
be available in a laboratory setting, and at a substantially lower cost. Furthermore, 
AMT has controls in place to help alleviate some of the typical concerns raised with 
online experiments (as discussed in Bloomfield and Rennekamp [2009]). On average, 
participants in my study have some experience with investing, have taken some 
accounting and finance courses, have more than a decade of full-time work 
experience, and take the task seriously enough to correctly answer questions that 
check for their attention. Future work should consider utilizing AMT (or other online 
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crowd-sourcing platforms) for accounting research, particularly with respect to the 
judgments of less-sophisticated investors. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF PERFORMANCE AND REPORTING GOALS ON 
MANAGERS’ CHOICE OF REPORTING COMPLEXITY IN DISCLOSURES 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Theory predicts that the market reaction to information will be weaker as it 
becomes more difficult or costly to extract (Bloomfield [2002]; Hirshleifer and Teoh 
[2003]). Consistent with this prediction, recent studies in the accounting literature 
demonstrate that reporting complexity in qualitative disclosures is associated with 
weaker reactions to news (You and Zhang [2009]; Rennekamp [2012]) and lower 
trading volume among small investors (Miller [2010]).20 
Some prior studies have argued that managers use this to their advantage and 
intentionally increase the reporting complexity of annual reports when firm 
performance deteriorates (e.g., Subramanian, Insley and Blackwell [1993]; Courtis 
[1998]; Li [2008]). For example, Li’s [2008] “management obfuscation hypothesis” 
proposes that managers strategically increase the processing cost of adverse 
information in order to reduce or delay its incorporation into stock price. Using 
techniques from computational linguistics, Li [2008] finds the first large-sample 
evidence that loss firms prepare annual reports that are both longer and less-readable 
than firms with positive earnings. Among firms with positive earnings, firms with 
more transitory earnings prepare longer and less-readable annual reports.   
Bloomfield [2008] acknowledges that managers may intentionally obfuscate 
                                                 
20 For the purposes of this chapter and experiment, I define a text as higher in reporting complexity if it 
is (1) longer and/or (2) less readable, consistent with Miller [2010]. You and Zhang [2009] focus on 
reporting length, while Rennekamp [2012] focuses on readability. Miller [2010] investigates both 
components of reporting complexity. 
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bad performance to mitigate investors’ reactions. However, he also suggests that the 
reporting complexity of disclosures might increase when firm performance is poor 
simply because the language used to describe poor performance may be inherently 
more complex. Specifically, Bloomfield [2008] suggests that reporting complexity 
might increase if negative events are more unique or unusual, and if unusual events 
require more complex language to explain.21 Bloomfield’s [2008] explanation presents 
an important alternative to the idea that managers intentionally obfuscate information 
about poor performance.  
I use an experiment to investigate these two potential explanations for 
reporting complexity during periods of poor performance. In my experiment, 
participants are asked to assume that they are the Vice President of a division in a 
hypothetical firm, and are told that they have been asked to draft a report to 
headquarters describing the division’s performance in the most recent quarter.22 I 
manipulate between-subjects whether the division performed well or poorly in the 
most recent quarter, and whether budgeting decisions for the next year have already 
been made. Participants are then told to prepare a draft report to headquarters that 
conveys performance honestly. In the condition where budgeting decisions have 
already been made for the coming year, participants’ only explicit incentive is to 
provide an accurate report. In the condition where budgeting decisions have not yet 
                                                 
21 Bloomfield [2008] also suggests that disclosure complexity may increase if managers engage in 
biased attribution, management by exception, misdirection, or are concerned about litigation. However, 
while biased attribution could change the actual words that managers choose, it is less clear that biased 
attribution would make a disclosure longer and/or less readable. Similarly, management by exception or 
the use of misdirection is likely to make a disclosure longer, but not necessarily less readable. Finally, 
addressing managers’ concerns with litigation is outside the scope of my study. 
22 I use a setting of internal performance reporting in order to remove legal and other considerations 
that might be present in an external performance reporting setting to investors. I believe that this 
decision choice reduces noise in my responses, while allowing me to still address fundamental 
questions about linguistic choices in performance reporting decisions. 
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been made, participants are still told to provide a report that is accurate, but are also 
told to highlight the positive aspects of the division in order to secure more funding for 
the future. This design choice imparts participants with a strategic reporting goal of 
presenting the division as favorably as possible.  
The fundamental purpose of language is to communicate, and findings from 
sociolinguistics research support the idea that linguistic choices vary to reflect thought 
processes, motives and emotions, particularly during periods of personal upheaval or 
shared crisis (Pennebaker and Lay [2002]; Pennebaker, Mehl and Niederhoffer 
[2003]). Thus, I use methods from computational linguistics to analyze the natural 
language choices that participants make to describe the division’s performance in light 
of their reporting goals (Tausczik and Pennebaker [2010]).   
I predict and find that when participants are asked to explain the division’s 
performance, their reports are significantly longer and less-readable when 
performance is bad than when performance is good. This finding holds even when 
participants are told that their only goal is to accurately convey performance, and is 
consistent with Bloomfield’s [2008] suggestion that poor performance may be 
inherently more difficult to explain concisely and in more readable language. 
However, I do not find that poor performance interacts with reporting goals in the 
predicted way. Based on arguments in the prior literature, my initial prediction is that 
reporting complexity will be greatest when performance is bad and participants are 
given explicit instructions to prepare a report that will help the division secure future 
funding (i.e., a strategic reporting goal is present). While this goal does lead 
participants to provide significantly longer reports, the reports are significantly more 
readable than when participants are only given a goal of reporting accurately.  
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There are at least three potential explanations for the discrepancy between my 
findings and the arguments made in prior literature that reporting complexity is used to 
intentionally obfuscate poor performance. One is that prior studies may have instead 
picked up on the inherent complexity required to explain bad performance (as opposed 
to strategic obfuscation), as suggested by Bloomfield [2008]. Secondly, it is also 
possible that the discrepancy stems from differences in my setting compared to that of 
a typical archival study. My experiment focuses on an internal reporting setting, in 
order to get at the fundamental question of how individuals describe performance as 
incentives to present themselves favorably vary. This choice likely reduces noise in 
participants’ responses, but may also fail to capture some of the additional 
considerations that managers face when making external reporting decisions. Finally, I 
use a setting where participants describe hypothetical performance, rather than their 
performance on a real task (e.g., intelligence tasks, manufacturing tasks, etc.). As 
discussed in more detail in Section 2.3.3, this mitigates potential confounds between 
linguistic choices and intelligence. However, a consequent downside of asking 
participants to describe hypothetical performance is that it potentially reduces their 
personal involvement in the task, and may influence their linguistic choices as well.  
In addition to the results discussed above, I also provide some preliminary 
evidence on how other linguistic choices are affected by variation in performance and 
reporting goals. I find that participants use more personal pronouns when performance 
is good than when performance is bad, particularly when they have a strategic 
reporting goal. This is consistent with prior work suggesting that individuals can use 
personal pronouns to associate themselves with a message (Hyland [2005]) and make 
it more persuasive (Asay, Libby and Rennekamp [2012]). I also find that, when 
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performance is bad, participants use more past tense language when they have an 
accuracy goal, and more future tense language when they have a strategic reporting 
goal. 
My findings add to the growing body of literature investigating the linguistic 
style of disclosures as opposed to linguistic content. Linguistic content is the literal 
meaning of the information conveyed, or the concrete facts contained in a disclosure, 
whereas linguistic style captures the methods used to convey meaning to the audience. 
Controlling for actual firm performance, recent archival studies use methods from 
computational linguistics to analyze large bodies of text, as suggested by Core [2001]. 
However, these studies focus almost exclusively on investigating whether various 
linguistic style factors affect trading behavior and convey incremental information to 
the market.23 My study, on the other hand, uses a controlled experiment to provide 
complementary evidence on managers’ disclosure choices while holding constant 
other factors that are not of primary interest. I find that firm performance and explicit 
reporting goals affect choice of reporting complexity. Future experimental research 
might investigate additional linguistic choices that have been shown to reflect 
individuals’ motives and circumstances (e.g. linguistic tone, causal explanations, etc.). 
Future research might also investigate both written and spoken settings of managerial 
communication (e.g. annual reports, interviews, conference calls, etc.).   
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides 
background information and develops my hypotheses. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 discuss my 
                                                 
23 Some factors investigated include Readability (Li [2008]; Miller [2010]; Loughran and McDonald 
[2011]), Certainty (Demers and Vega [2010]), Numerical Intensity (Henry [2008]), Boilerplate vs. 
Meaningful Language (Nelson and Pritchard [2007]), and Tone (Nelson and Pritchard [2007]; Henry 
[2008]; Davis, Piger and Sedor [2011]; Demers and Vega [2010]; and Feldman, Govindaraj, Livnat and 
Segal [2009]), to name a few. 
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experiment and results, respectively. Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 Background and Development of Hypotheses 
At its core, language is a social construct. Words (whether written or spoken) 
are the primary tool that individuals use to communicate with others on a day-to-day 
basis. It is not surprising then that findings from research on sociolinguistics suggest 
that the linguistic choices of individuals reveal their social-psychological processes 
and vary with personal and environmental circumstances (Gee [1999]; Pennebaker et 
al. [2003]). In a financial reporting context, prior findings suggest that the linguistic 
characteristics of qualitative disclosures are likely to vary with firm performance (for 
reviews, see Jones and Shoemaker [1994]; Merkl-Davies and Brennan [2007]; and Li 
[2011]). For the purposes of this study, I focus on variation in reporting complexity, 
where a disclosure is higher in reporting complexity if it is longer and less readable (Li 
[2008]; Miller [2010]). Variation in reporting complexity may be due to intentional 
(conscious) choices or may be an unintentional consequence of environmental 
circumstances. 
2.2.1 Strategic Obfuscation by Management 
Much of the accounting literature assumes that choices of reporting complexity 
are conscious, and that managers attempt to obfuscate poor performance but highlight 
good performance (for reviews see Jones and Shoemaker [1994]; and Li [2008]). 
Using a sample of 60 U.S. firms, Subramanian, Insley and Blackwell [1993] look at 
how readability of the Chairman’s Letter varies with firm performance. Over a two-
year period, they divide their sample into firms where net profit either increases or 
decreases in the second year of the period, compared to the first. They find that 
readability is significantly higher for the group of firms where performance improves 
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rather than deteriorates.24 Courtis [1998] finds that firms with more media attention 
have Chairman’s Letters that are less readable. He claims that this is consistent with an 
obfuscation hypothesis. That is, firms with bad news may be more likely to receive 
media coverage, and may also be more likely to try and obfuscate the bad news by 
reducing the readability of the Chairman’s Letter. However, Rutherford [2003] argues 
that previous studies of the obfuscation hypothesis (pre-2003) should be interpreted 
cautiously, because they rely on “small samples of tests, testing of limited amounts of 
text, and the application of weak tests of association”.25 Li [2008] provides some of 
the first large-sample evidence on the issue. Using the FOG index and disclosure 
length to measure reporting complexity, Li [2008] finds that firms with higher 
earnings have annual reports that are shorter and more readable. Furthermore, when 
performance is positive, firms with more readable annual reports have more persistent 
positive earnings. Li [2008] concludes that firms intentionally provide less-readable 
annual reports when performance is poor or when positive performance is 
unsustainable. 
In his response to Li [2008], Bloomfield [2008] concedes that management 
obfuscation is a plausible hypothesis, and follows up with a case study for a single 
firm’s MD&A over three years. The chosen firm has positive earnings in the first year, 
record earnings in the second year, and negative earnings in the third year. Consistent 
with Li’s [2008] findings, Bloomfield [2008] finds that the length of the annual report 
is longer in the loss year and transitory positive earnings year than in the persistent 
                                                 
24 However, Subramanian et al. [1993] conduct no analyses that would rule out reverse-causality. That 
is, it is possible that firms with better management (who would be more likely to fall in the group with 
improving performance) were already providing more readable disclosures. 
25 And, in fact, many of the pre-2003 studies do not find evidence that readability varies with 
performance (e.g., Courtis [1986], Jones [1988], and Clatworthy and Jones [2001]). Again, Rutherford 
[2003] points out that it is difficult to interpret these early studies. 
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positive earnings year. Bloomfield [2008] also finds that much of the increased length 
in the loss year is attributable to inclusion of additional information on fairly standard 
accounting issues, suggesting that they were added to the MD&A to bog down readers 
and obfuscate the firm’s performance. Finally, Bloomfield [2008] also points out that 
firms’ disclosures may be more detailed if they provide biased attribution or attempt to 
misdirect readers’ attention, both of which are consistent with managers trying to 
obfuscate information and mitigate reactions. 
Recent research in the accounting literature supports the idea that intentional 
obfuscation may be a useful strategy for managers, and finds evidence consistent with 
the prediction that disclosure complexity dampens investors’ reactions to good and 
bad news. You and Zhang [2009] use word-count as their proxy for reporting 
complexity and find that market underreaction is more severe as the complexity of the 
10-K increases. Using techniques from computational linguistics, Miller [2010] 
develops a proprietary measure of disclosure readability based on the SEC’s plain 
English guidelines to show that improved 10-K readability is associated with increased 
trading by small investors (i.e. those who are likely to have the most difficulty with 
complex disclosures).26 Likewise, Rennekamp [2012] uses an experimental setting to 
show that more readable disclosures lead to stronger reactions from investors to both 
good and bad news. She shows that this holds even for relatively short disclosures, 
where there are no significant differences in the actual amount of information that 
investors are able to acquire.  
Prior research also suggests that managers understand that less-transparent 
disclosures reduce the likelihood that investors and analysts will be able to extract 
                                                 
26 Miller [2010] finds similar results when he instead measures disclosure length. 
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information. For example, managers are more likely to engage in earnings 
management activities when their decisions are less-transparent, suggesting that they 
believe transparency makes earnings management a more value-enhancing activity 
(for a review, see Libby and Seybert [2009]). 
2.2.2 The Inherent Complexity of Explaining Poor Performance 
In addition to providing evidence supporting a management obfuscation story, 
Bloomfield [2008] outlines an alternative, and less sinister, explanation for variation 
in annual report readability. He argues that the actual language associated with poor 
performance may be inherently more complex, especially given that poor performance 
is often due to unique or unusual circumstances.27  
Consistent with this line of thinking, Daft and Macintosh [1981] argue that 
non-routine situations require greater information processing than routine situations. 
As a result, managers are more likely to convey non-routine information through 
richer mediums, such as face-to-face meetings rather than written reports (Daft, 
Lengel and Trevino [1987]). This matching of situational complexity to 
communication medium is more pronounced in high-performing managers (Daft et al. 
[1987]). Daft and Macintosh [1981] also suggest that routine situations are easier to 
analyze and summarize with quantitative information, whereas non-routine situations 
are more likely to be analyzed and summarized with qualitative information. This 
latter point is consistent with the idea that poor (and therefore non-routine) 
performance requires more explanation via words instead of summary numbers. More 
                                                 
27 Other studies have looked at how reporting complexity varies in response to catering to certain types 
of investors. Kalay [2011] finds that sophisticated investors concentrate their trading in firms with more 
opaque information environments, presumably because they can take advantage of the greater 
information asymmetry in these types of firms. Similarly, Lehavy, Li and Merkley [2011] show that 
analysts also appear to be drawn to less readable disclosures, where their analysis is likely to be most 
needed. 
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explanation via words could both increase disclosure length and reduce disclosure 
readability, the two components of reporting complexity that I investigate in this 
study.  
Rutherford [2003] examines the Management’s Discussion and Analysis 
(MD&A) of firms’ annual reports, and regresses reporting complexity on a variety of 
factors that could support either an obfuscation hypothesis or a “firm characteristics” 
story. While he finds some evidence that relatively risky and heavily regulated firms 
have less readable disclosures, he finds the greatest support for length being positively 
correlated with organizational size and complexity. While Rutherford’s [2003] 
emphasis is on how organizational complexity drives reporting complexity, his 
findings suggest that environmental complexity (as in the case of poor performance, 
which is relatively more unique than good performance) could also be positively 
associated with reporting complexity. 
Combined, findings outlined in the discussion above support the idea that bad 
performance requires more reporting complexity to explain. As a result, my first set of 
hypotheses is: 
H1a:   Managers provide longer disclosures when a firm is performing 
poorly than when a firm is performing well. 
H1b: Managers provide less readable disclosures when a firm is 
performing poorly than when a firm is performing well. 
My second set of hypotheses recognizes that the alternative argument for 
strategic obfuscation of poor performance by management is also plausible, and that 
the two possibilities need not be mutually exclusive. Given that managers appear to 
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understand the benefits of less-transparent disclosures, and that linguistic 
characteristics have been shown to vary with individuals’ incentives, my second 
hypothesis is that: 
H2a:   When a firm is performing poorly, managers provide longer 
disclosures when they have a goal to elicit a favorable reaction 
than when they have a goal to convey information accurately. 
H2b: When a firm is performing poorly, managers provide less 
readable disclosures when they have a goal to elicit a favorable 
reaction than when they have a goal to convey information 
accurately. 
 Figure 7 depicts H1a and H2a, and Figure 8 depicts H1b and H2b graphically. 
Combined, my four hypotheses predict that the reporting complexity of managers’ 
disclosures will be influenced by the inherent difficulty of providing an explanation 
for bad performance, but also by intentional obfuscation of information when goals of 
eliciting a favorable reaction are especially salient. 
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Figure 7. Expected Pattern of Results for the Length Measure of Reporting 
Complexity  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Expected Pattern of Results for the Readability Measures of Reporting 
Complexity28 
 
                                                 
28 As discussed in Section 2.3.4, all four readability measures (FOG, Flesch-Kincaid, BOG and 
READscore) are measured such that higher values indicate lower readability. 
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2.3 Experiment 
2.3.1 Participants 
Participants are 189 individuals recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
platform in exchange for a $1.00 payment.29 Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (AMT) is an 
internet labor market that allows “Requesters” to pay individuals to complete “Human 
Intelligence Tasks” (HITs), and is an increasingly popular source of experimental data 
for social scientists (Paolacci, Chandler and Ipeirotis [2010]). Furthermore, studies run 
on AMT have been shown to reliably replicate a wide range of prior JDM findings 
(Paolacci et al. [2010]; Horton, Rand and Zeckhauser [2011]). The average participant 
is 33.77 years old, and has 12.17 years of full time work experience. Participants have 
completed an average of 1.95 accounting and 1.99 finance courses. On average, 
participants take 13 minutes to the complete the task. Because my study deals with 
linguistic choices, I specifically recruit participants who (1) live in the United States 
and (2) consider English to be their native language. This particular sample of 
participants should have sufficient knowledge to act as managers, read a few facts, and 
prepare a simple report on the performance of a fictitious division within a firm.  
2.3.2 Design and Manipulations 
Participants are told to assume that they are the Vice President of the 
Beverages and Snacks division of Dexico, a hypothetical firm. My experiment uses a 
2x2 between-subjects design, manipulating whether the division (1) has performed 
                                                 
29 Initially, 200 participants were recruited. However, six participants were excluded after self-
identifying as non-native English speakers despite my recruiting instructions disallowing this. Two 
additional participants were excluded for not providing a draft report according to the experimental 
instructions. Finally, three additional participants were excluded for having IP addresses identical to 
those of participants that had already completed the task.  This last exclusion was meant to rule out 
responses of potential repeat participants. All inferences discussed in Section 2.4 are unchanged if 
responses from these eleven participants are included. 
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well or poorly in the most recent quarter, and (2) has or has not yet had its budget set 
by headquarters for the upcoming year. Participants are also told that the president of 
their division has asked them to draft a report to headquarters explaining the division’s 
performance.  
2.3.3 Task and Procedure 
After reading a brief introduction to the task, participants are presented with a 
short paragraph containing my experimental manipulations. In the good (bad) 
performance condition, participants are told that the Beverages and Snacks division of 
Dexico delivered a 10% increase (decrease) in sales this quarter compared to the same 
quarter last year. They are also told that this performance is better (worse) than all 
other divisions within the company, and better (worse) than most other firms in the 
same industry. In the accuracy (strategic reporting) goal condition, participants are 
told that budgeting decisions have (have not) yet been made by headquarters for the 
upcoming year. In the accuracy goal condition, participants are told that their only 
goal is to provide an accurate report, since budgeting decisions have already been 
made for next year. In the strategic reporting goal condition, participants are told that 
since budgeting decisions have not yet been made for next year, they should provide 
an accurate report, but also highlight the positive aspects of the division to secure 
more funding. In other words, participants in the strategic reporting condition should 
be more attuned to presenting their division’s performance in as favorable a light as 
possible, particularly when performance is bad. 
 Upon learning about the division’s recent performance and budgeting status, 
participants are taken to a page explaining that they are about to receive four facts 
about their division. They are told that they may use as many or as few of the facts as 
 56 
they would like to prepare their report. In order to encourage participants to write 
reasonably lengthy and detailed reports, they are (in all conditions) encouraged to 
embellish details as necessary in order to provide a more coherent explanation to 
headquarters for the division’s performance. To facilitate the embellishment, 
participants are given an example before continuing on to the main task. Participants 
consider the hypothetical fact that “The division moved its administrative offices into 
a new building this quarter.” They are told that, if the division performed well, they 
might describe the fact as “The move to a new office revitalized employees. They 
were more excited about coming to work, the transition to the new facilities went 
smoothly, and most employees expressed that the new location made their commute 
easier." In contrast, participants are told that if the division performed poorly, they 
might describe the fact as “The move to a new office demoralized employees. They 
were less excited about coming to work, the transition to the new facilities did not go 
smoothly, and most employees expressed that the new location made their commute 
more difficult.” Reporting complexity is held as constant as possible for the good and 
bad performance examples. 
 After looking over the example, participants proceed to a page containing the 
actual four facts available for use in their report, and are instructed that the facts are 
presented in no particular order. To choose the four facts to be included, I started by 
presenting a larger list of facts to 60 individuals (also recruited from AMT and 
verified to be different participants than those in the current study).  For each fact 
presented to them, these individuals were asked to rate on a 101-point scale whether 
the fact was “unambiguously negative” (0) or “unambiguously positive” (100). For the 
current study, I retained the four facts that did not significantly differ from the 
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midpoint of 50 on the scale. This was designed to ensure that participants in my study 
could plausibly use any of the four facts (held constant across all conditions) to 
explain either good or bad performance in the division.  
Below the four facts is a box in which participants can type their draft report 
(see Figure 9). They are told that they must remain on the page for at least three 
minutes, in order to give them time to draft the report. After three minutes have 
passed, a box pops up allowing them to move forward in the study whenever they are 
ready.  
 
Figure 9. Screen Shot Showing the Four Ambiguous Facts Provided to 
Participants for the Preparation of their Report 
 
 
Finally, participants answer manipulation check questions, questions about 
their report, and demographic questions.   
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 Instead of asking participants to describe the performance of a hypothetical 
firm, an alternative possibility would have been to ask participants to complete a real 
performance task and describe the actual outcome. For example, prior accounting 
studies have asked participants to create rebus puzzles (Kachelmeier, Reichert and 
Williamson [2008]; Kachelmeier and Williamson [2010]) complete a sandwich-
making task (Farrell, Kadous and Towry [2008]), or complete a trivia task (Libby and 
Rennekamp [2012]). However, performance in these types of tasks is likely to be 
confounded with intelligence. As a result, if I had used a real performance task in my 
study, any observed differences in language choices might be driven by the 
intelligence underlying performance rather than good or bad performance on its own.  
2.3.4 Primary Dependent Variables  
Prior studies describe disclosures as higher in reporting complexity if they are 
(1) longer and (2) less readable (e.g., Rutherford [2003], Miller [2010]). My primary 
dependent variables capture these two constructs. 
Length. Length is measured as the number of words that participants provide 
in their report, and is counted using Stylewriter software.30  
Measuring the length of participants’ reports is simple, but measuring 
readability is quite a bit more complex. The increased complexity stems, at least in 
part, from disagreement in the literature over how best to measure “readability” 
(Dubay [2004]).  The four measures I use, along with their benefits and costs, are 
described in more detail below. 
FOG. The FOG index was developed in order to easily analyze the readability 
of written language. It is calculated as ((words/sentence) + 100*(words with three or 
                                                 
30 See http://www.stylewriter-usa.com/ for more information on this software. 
 59 
more syllables/words))*0.40. The output of the formula is meant to approximate the 
years of formal education that an individual would need to understand a given text 
upon a single reading. While the FOG index is easy to calculate, and its use is 
widespread, some have argued that it is too simple to provide a meaningful measure of 
readability (Dubay [2004]), particularly in business communications (Jones and 
Shoemaker [1994]; Miller [2010]; Loughran and McDonald [2011]). For example, 
multi-syllabic words such as “telecommunication” or “depreciation” would increase 
measures of the FOG index, although they are unlikely to be difficult to read for most 
investors.  
Flesch-Kincaid. Like the FOG index, the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level 
Formula (Flesch-Kincaid) incorporates word length and sentence length to come up 
with an estimate of the grade level necessary to comprehend a given text. Its formula 
is calculated as 0.39*(words/sentence) + 11.8*(total syllables/words) – 15.59. Like the 
FOG index, Flesch-Kincaid is praised for its simplicity, but questioned for its ability 
to provide a meaningful measure of readability (Dubay [2004]). I use both the FOG 
and Flesch-Kincaid measures in my study because of their widespread use in other 
domains, with the caveat that they are unlikely to be robust measures of readability. 
BOG. My last two measures of readability are more complex, but should better 
capture actual levels of readability than simple formulas based only on word and 
sentence length. The BOG index is a proprietary measure of readability developed by 
creators of Stylewriter software, and includes three components. The first component 
is “Sentence Bog”, which measures the appropriateness of sentence length for a 
particular type of document. Stylewriter allows users to specify what type of document 
is being analyzed (e.g., advertisement, technical report, student essay, etc.). Sentence 
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Bog is calculated as [Average Sentence Length]^2 divided by a “Long Sentence Limit” 
for the type of document specified. The second component of BOG is “Word Bog”, 
which evaluates the proportion of words that represent common writing style problems 
(e.g., passive voice, too many abbreviations and acronyms, etc.). The third component 
of BOG is “Pep”, which measures the use of features that make the reader’s job easier 
and more enjoyable (e.g., greater sentence variety, personal pronouns, short sentences, 
etc.). The final BOG index measure is calculated as Sentence Bog + Word Bog – Pep, 
with all three components adjusted for the linguistic features that are appropriate for a 
particular type of communication. In my setting, I select Stylewriter’s “Report” option 
as the type of communication to be analyzed. 
READscore. In addition to providing a comprehensive measure of readability 
with its “BOG index”, Stylewriter allows users to measure certain individual linguistic 
features of a document. Miller [2010] uses this feature in his analysis of firms’ annual 
reports. Similarly, I develop my own measure of readability, which includes most of 
the features of readability that are manipulated in Rennekamp [2012]. My measure of 
readability is similar to Miller’s [2010] approach, and is calculated as instances of 
[(Passive Voice + Hidden Verbs + Superfluous words + Negations + Complex 
Synonyms – Personal Pronouns)*10]/Total words.31,32 
 While my four measures of readability vary in their components and precision, 
they are all significantly correlated at p<0.10, with the exception of the correlation 
between the READscore measure and the Flesch-Kincaid measure (ρ=0.08, p=0.302).  
                                                 
31 The number of Negations and Personal Pronouns are calculated using LIWC 2007 software rather 
than Stylewriter, because Stylewriter does not separately report these two linguistic style features. 
32 The two manipulations included in Rennekamp [2012] but not measured in this study are (1) sentence 
length, and (2) whether the subject, verb and object are kept in order and together. Neither of these two 
features can be easily measured and incorporated into the READscore calculation. 
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2.4 Results 
On average, participants prepare a report that is approximately 104 words long, 
with an average of five sentences. The number of facts used by participants in their 
reports does not vary by condition (p=0.653, two-tailed), and there are no significant 
differences across conditions in participants’ ratings of how difficult it was to prepare 
their report (p=0.299, two-tailed). This suggests that my experiment was successful in 
providing participants with neutral facts upon which to base their reports (i.e., facts 
which could be interpreted in a positive or negative way).  
For my manipulation check questions, 97.88% of participants correctly report 
whether the division’s performance was good or bad in the most recent quarter, while 
83.60% of participants correctly report whether their primary reporting goal was to 
report accurately vs. report in a way that presented their division as favorably as 
possible.33  
2.4.1 The Main Effect of Performance on Reporting Complexity 
H1a and H1b predict that reporting complexity will be greater when 
participants explain bad performance than when they explain good performance. The 
components of reporting complexity I investigate are length (H1a) and readability 
(H1b).  
Panel A of Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for my length measure, by 
condition. Panel B of Table 1 shows that, consistent with H1a, participants provide 
longer reports when performance is bad than when it is good (p=0.053, one-tailed).34 
                                                 
33 Inferences on the results described in Section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 are unchanged if I exclude participants 
who answered manipulation check questions incorrectly. 
34 Inferences are unchanged if I instead use a nonparametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum test for the main 
effect of bad performance on median report length. 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Analysis of Variance – Report Length 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics - Mean, (Standard Deviation), and [Median]
Performance Accuracy
Strategic 
Reporting Overall
Good 95.347 102.220 98.478
(40.052) (34.711) (37.664)
[86] [92] [87.5]
n=49 n=41 n=90
Bad 101.712 118.234 109.556
(32.721) (70.751) (54.549)
[92.5] [91] [92]
n=52 n=47 n=99
Overall 98.624 110.772
(36.418) (57.143)
[90] [91.5]
n=101 n=88
Panel B. Results of Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Source S.S. d.f. M.S. F-statistic p-value
Performance 5870.945 1 5870.945 2.649 0.053*
Goal 6416.092 1 6416.092 2.895 0.091
Performance x Goal 1091.616 1 1091.616 0.493 0.484
Panel C. Results of Contrast-Coded Analysis of Variance
Source S.S. d.f. M.S. F-statistic p-value
Performance x Goal 9630.946 1 9630.946 4.345 0.019*
Residual 3947.967 2 1973.983 0.891 0.408
Error 410069.225 185 2216.590
Primary Goal
 
Notes to Table 4. Panel A presents descriptive statistics on the length measure in my 
experiment, in which 189 participants draft a report explaining the performance of a 
division in a hypothetical firm. As discussed in Section 2.3.4, the readability measure 
is calculated such that higher values indicate lower readability. Panel B presents 
ANOVA results investigating whether firm performance affects report length. Panel C 
presents results from a contrast-coded ANOVA. The cells of the experiment receive 
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contrast weights as follows: Bad Performance/Strategic Goal = +3, Bad Performance/ 
Accuracy Goal = +1, Good Performance/Strategic Goal = -2, and Good 
Performance/Accuracy Goal =   -2.  P-values indicated with asterisks (*) are one-
tailed, given my directional predictions. 
 
 
 
Panel A of Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 shows descriptive statistics for my four measures 
of readability: FOG, Flesch-Kincaid, BOG and READscore, respectively. Panel B of 
Table 5 shows that H1b is not supported with the FOG measure of readability 
(p=0.495, one-tailed). Panel B of Table 6 shows that H1b is also not supported with 
the Flesch-Kincaid measure of readability (p=0.451,one-tailed). 
However, as noted in Section 2.3.4, both the FOG and Flesch-Kincaid measures 
may not be very precise measures of readability, despite their widespread use. This is 
because of their relatively simple calculations, based on word length and sentence 
length. Figures 10 and 11 show examples of reports provided by participants that were 
in the Bottom 10% (“most readable”) and Top 10% (“least readable”) on both the 
FOG and Flesch-Kincaid measures. Both examples are around 90 words long. While 
the “less readable” example shown in Figure 11 does use some reasonably large words 
compared to the “more readable” example shown in Figure 10 (e.g., innovating, 
groundbreaking, synergy, etc.), they are hardly words that would be considered less 
readable to the average reader of a business communication. 
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics and Analysis of Variance – FOG Measure of 
Readability 
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics - Mean, (Standard Deviation), and [Median]
Performance Accuracy
Strategic 
Reporting Overall
Good 13.311 13.067 13.186
(2.472) (2.562) (2.503)
[13.380] [12.480] [13.190]
n=49 n=41 n=90
Bad 13.198 13.160 13.180
(2.668) (2.877) (2.755)
[12.865] [12.5] [12.860]
n=52 n=47 n=99
Overall 13.252 13.103
(2.563) (2.720)
[12.940] [12.490]
n=101 n=88
Panel B. Results of Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Source S.S. d.f. M.S. F-statistic p-value
Performance 0.001 1 0.001 0.000 0.495*
Goal 1.137 1 1.137 0.162 0.688
Performance x Goal 0.653 1 0.653 0.093 0.761
Primary Goal
 
Notes to Table 5. Panel A presents descriptive statistics on the FOG readability 
measure in my experiment, in which 189 participants draft a report explaining the 
performance of a division in a hypothetical firm. As discussed in Section 2.3.4, the 
readability measure is calculated such that higher values indicate lower readability. 
Panel B presents ANOVA results investigating whether firm performance affects 
readability of the report. The reported p-value for the effect of performance (indicated 
with an asterisk) is one-tailed, given my directional prediction. 
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics and Analysis of Variance – Flesch-Kincaid 
Measure of Readability 
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics - Mean, (Standard Deviation), and [Median]
Performance Accuracy
Strategic 
Reporting Overall
Good 11.771 11.179 11.501
(2.301) (2.326) (2.319)
[11.910] [11.090] [11.350]
n=49 n=41 n=90
Bad 11.477 11.557 11.515
(2.298) (2.414) (2.342)
[11.205] [11.230] [11.220]
n=52 n=47 n=99
Overall 11.620 11.381
(2.293) (2.368)
[11.360] [11.150]
n=101 n=88
Panel B. Results of Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Source S.S. d.f. M.S. F-statistic p-value
Performance 0.083 1 0.083 0.015 0.451*
Goal 3.087 1 3.087 0.567 0.453
Performance x Goal 5.296 1 5.296 0.972 0.326
Primary Goal
 
Notes to Table 6. Panel A presents descriptive statistics on the Flesch-Kincaid 
readability measure in my experiment, in which 189 participants draft a report 
explaining the performance of a division in a hypothetical firm. As discussed in 
Section 2.3.4, the readability measure is calculated such that higher values indicate 
lower readability. Panel B presents ANOVA results investigating whether firm 
performance affects readability of the report. The reported p-value for the effect of 
performance (indicated with an asterisk) is one-tailed, given my directional prediction. 
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“The division performed very well this quarter for a few reasons. First of all, there was 
a shift in the product lines. Two of our old products were cut and replaced by two new 
ones. This probably contributed to the division’s performance.   Also, we had an 
important change in leadership. Our old head of Market Research retired and, although 
he was a good worker, he was replaced by a more energetic member of the staff. He 
did a great job in accepting his new responsibilities and performed in a stellar 
manner.” 
Figure 10. Sample Report from the Bottom 10% (Most Readable) of both the 
FOG and Flesch-Kincaid Measures. 
 
 
“Despite fluctuating transportation costs and the loss of long-time leader Jacob 
Estleman, the Beverage and Snack team was able to post a 10% sales increase. This 
was a result of not only innovating with new products, but also increasing staff 
synergy by replacing Jacob with our own Sally Washington, whose years of 
experience and close contacts within our team enabled great cooperation and team 
camaraderie. In the coming year, we plan to continue our groundbreaking work with 
further research into trending opportunities and forging an industry-leading team.” 
Figure 11. Sample Report from the Top 10% (Least Readable) of both the FOG 
and Flesch-Kincaid Measures. 
 
 
Panel B of Tables 7 and 8 shows results for the BOG and READscore 
measures, respectively. Again, these are the two readability scores that I argue are 
likely to be a better gauge of actual disclosure readability, because they capture more 
detailed stylistic choices that have been argued to facilitate or impede readers’ 
processing. Panel B of Table 7 shows that, consistent with H1b, bad performance is 
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associated with a significantly higher BOG score (p<0.001, one-tailed). The simple 
main effects of bad performance are also positive and significant in both the Accuracy 
condition (p<0.001, one-tailed, untabulated) and the Strategic Reporting condition 
(p=0.048, one-tailed, untabulated). Recall that a higher BOG score indicates writing 
that is less readable.35 
Panel B of Table 8 shows that, also consistent with H1b, bad performance is 
associated with a significantly higher READscore value (p<0.001, one-tailed). The 
simple main effects of bad performance are also positive and significant in both the 
Accuracy condition (p=0.006, one-tailed, untabulated) and the Strategic Reporting 
condition (p=0.002, one-tailed, untabulated). As with the other measures of 
readability, a higher READscore value indicates writing that is less readable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 Inferences are identical if I instead use a nonparametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum test for the main effect 
of performance on the BOG measure (p<0.001, one-tailed, untabulated). Inferences are also identical (at 
p<0.001, one-tailed, untabulated) if I exclude one participant in the Bad Performance/Accuracy 
condition that has a BOG score of 262, which is considerably higher than any other participants. For 
reference, the next closest BOG score is 103, and the overall mean [median] for all participants is 
57.042 [56].  
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics and Analysis of Variance – BOG  Measure of 
Readability 
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics - Mean, (Standard Deviation), and [Median]
Performance Accuracy
Strategic 
Reporting Overall
Good 54.245 46.610 50.767
(18.291) (22.149) (20.385)
[54.000] [44.000] [50.500]
n=49 n=41 n=90
Bad 69.558 55.213 62.747
(33.177) (17.943) (27.853)
[66.500] [55.000] [63.000]
n=52 n=47 n=99
Overall 62.129 51.205
(27.948) (20.357)
[60.000] [51.500]
n=101 n=88
Panel B. Results of Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Source S.S. d.f. M.S. F-statistic p-value
Performance 6704.889 1 6704.889 11.633 <0.001*
Goal 5663.432 1 5663.432 9.826 0.002
Performance x Goal 527.763 1 527.763 0.916 0.340
Primary Goal
 
Notes to Table 7. Panel A presents descriptive statistics on the BOG readability 
measure in my experiment, in which 189 participants draft a report explaining the 
performance of a division in a hypothetical firm. As discussed in Section 2.3.4, the 
readability measure is calculated such that higher values indicate lower readability. 
Panel B presents ANOVA results investigating whether firm performance affects 
readability of the report. The reported p-value for the effect of performance (indicated 
with an asterisk) is one-tailed, given my directional prediction. 
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Table 8. Descriptive Statistics and Analysis of Variance – READscore Measure of 
Readability 
 
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics - Mean, (Standard Deviation), and [Median]
Performance Accuracy
Strategic 
Reporting Overall
Good 0.026 -0.235 -0.093
(0.409) (0.536) (0.486)
[0.000] [-0.259] [-0.078]
n=49 n=41 n=90
Bad 0.277 0.072 0.180
(0.523) (0.536) (0.537)
[0.272] [0.000] [0.175]
n=52 n=47 n=99
Overall 0.155 -0.071
(0.485) (0.555)
[0.141] [-0.073]
n=101 n=88
Panel B. Results of Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
Source S.S. d.f. M.S. F-statistic p-value
Performance 3.653 1 3.653 14.475 <0.001*
Goal 2.543 1 2.543 10.076 0.002
Performance x Goal 0.036 1 0.036 0.141 0.708
Primary Goal
 
Notes to Table 8. Panel A presents descriptive statistics on the READscore readability 
measure in my experiment, in which 189 participants draft a report explaining the 
performance of a division in a hypothetical firm. As discussed in Section 2.3.4, the 
readability measure is calculated such that higher values indicate lower readability. 
Panel B presents ANOVA results investigating whether firm performance affects 
readability of the report. The reported p-value for the effect of performance (indicated 
with an asterisk) is one-tailed, given my directional prediction. 
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2.4.2 The Interaction between Performance and Goals on Reporting Complexity 
While H1a and H1b predict a positive main effect of bad performance on 
reporting complexity, H2a and H2b predict that reporting complexity will be even 
higher in the bad performance condition when participants have a strategic reporting 
goal (i.e., securing more funding for the division), rather than an accuracy goal. In 
other words, predictions for H2a and H2b are driven by the common argument that 
managers intentionally make bad news more linguistically complex in order to elicit a 
more favorable, or less negative, reaction to the bad news. Figure 7 depicts the 
expected pattern of results for the Length measure and the four Readability measures 
that capture reporting complexity. 
 Figure 12 shows that the actual pattern of results looks similar to the 
expectation for H2a (depicted in Figure 7) for the length measure of reporting 
complexity. To test the predicted interaction in H2a, I derive contrast weights using 
the procedure outlined in Buckless and Ravenscroft [1990]. The specific contrast 
weights are as follows: -2 in the Good Performance/Accuracy Condition, -2 in the 
Good Performance/Strategic Reporting Condition, +3 in the Bad Performance/ 
Strategic Reporting Condition, and +1 in the Bad Performance/Accuracy Condition. 
Results of this planned contrast are presented in Panel C of Table 4. As expected, I 
find support for the predicted interaction (p=0.019, one-tailed). I also find that the 
simple main effect of goal is significant for the bad performance condition (p=0.041, 
one-tailed, untabulated), but not for the good performance condition (p=0.246, one-
tailed, untabulated). Thus, H2a is supported.  
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Figure 12. Actual Pattern of Results for the Primary Dependent Variables 
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Figure 12 also shows that the actual pattern of results for each of the four 
measures of readability does not look similar to the expectation for H2b depicted in 
Figure 7. Likewise, there is no significant interaction between performance and goals 
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for any of the four measures. Panel B of Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 shows that the 
Performance x Goal interaction has a p-value greater than 0.10 for the FOG, Flesch-
Kincaid, BOG and READscore measures, respectively. Thus, H2b is not supported for 
any of the four measures of readability. However, I do find an unexpected main effect 
of the goal manipulation on both the BOG and READscore measures of readability. 
The strategic reporting goal leads participants to provide significantly more readable 
reports than does the accuracy goal, as measured using both the BOG (p=0.001, one-
tailed) and READscore (p=0.001, one-tailed) measures. For the BOG measure, this 
holds for both the good performance condition (p=0.067, one-tailed), and the bad 
performance condition (p=0.002, one-tailed). Likewise, for the READscore measure, 
this holds for both the good performance condition (p=0.008, two-tailed) and the bad 
performance condition (p=0.022, two-tailed). 
 Combined, the results do not appear to support arguments regarding intentional 
obfuscation of bad performance. Rather, when participants are asked to explain bad 
performance and have a strategic reporting goal to elicit a favorable reaction, they use 
significantly more readable language. While H2a is supported, and bad performance is 
accompanied by more lengthy descriptions when there is a goal of eliciting a favorable 
reaction, the lack of results for H2b suggest an alternative interpretation of H2a. 
Rather than providing more lengthy disclosures to obfuscate bad performance, it is 
possible that participants provide more lengthy disclosures in order to provide a more 
comprehensive explanation for poor performance, particularly given that participants 
increase the readability of these disclosures. This suggests that future researchers may 
want to reconsider using lengthiness of disclosures as an indicator of reporting 
complexity. 
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2.4.3 Supplemental Analyses 
In this section I report some additional evidence on how performance and 
goals affect certain linguistic choices in my experimental setting. One component of 
the READscore measure is the use of personal pronouns (e.g., “I” or “we”). Style 
guides often suggest that personal pronouns increase the readability of a written 
communication (see, for example, the SEC’s Plain English Guidelines).36 In addition, 
Hyland [2005] argues that greater use of personal pronouns is an indication that an 
individual is associating themselves more with a given message. Looking only at 
personal pronouns, I find that participants use significantly fewer personal pronouns in 
their reports when performance is bad than when it is good (p=0.013, one-tailed, 
untabulated), regardless of their reporting goals. This suggests that participants may 
want to distance themselves from bad performance news, consistent with Hyland’s 
arguments [2005]. I also find that participants use significantly more personal 
pronouns when they have a goal of presenting themselves as favorably as possible, but 
only when performance is good (p=0.050, one-tailed, untabulated) rather than bad 
(p=0.164, one-tailed-untabulated). Hyland [2001] argues that personal pronouns 
indicate greater commitment to a given message. Thus the greater use of personal 
pronouns when individuals have a strategic reporting goal and performance is good 
might indicate that participants use personal pronouns to display commitment to the 
message and to make their argument more convincing. Consistent with this, Asay, 
Libby and Rennekamp [2012] demonstrate that the use of personal pronouns can 
increase the persuasiveness of management communications, even for relatively short 
disclosures. 
                                                 
36 Prior accounting studies have also treated the use of personal pronouns as indicators of attribution 
bias (Li [2010b]) and narcissism (Chatterjee and Hambrick [2007]). 
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 Finally, I find that the accuracy goal leads to greater use of the past tense in 
participants’ reports (p=0.004, one-tailed, untabulated), regardless of whether 
performance is good (p=0.016, one-tailed, untabulated) or bad (p=0.048, one-tailed, 
untabulated). Alternatively, the strategic reporting goal to secure more funding leads 
to greater use of the future tense in participants’ reports (p=0.062, one-tailed, 
untabulated), but only when performance is bad (p=0.046, one-tailed, untabulated) 
rather than good (p=0.302, one-tailed, untabulated). This latter finding also suggests 
that, when performance is bad, participants shift away from using the past tense and 
towards using the future tense as their goal shifts from providing an accurate report to 
providing a report that serves a strategic reporting objective. Future research might 
further investigate how managers use linguistic characteristics to either (1) distance 
from or associate themselves with a message, or (2) shift investors’ attention away 
from less favorable information. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This study serves as a starting point for understanding the fundamental 
question of how performance and explicit goals affect managers’ choice of reporting 
complexity in qualitative disclosures. Using an experiment, I investigate linguistic 
choices in a controlled setting. I predict and find that participants provide reports that 
are significantly longer and less-readable when performance is bad than when 
performance is good. This finding holds even when participants are told that their only 
goal is to accurately convey performance, and is consistent with Bloomfield’s [2008] 
suggestion that poor performance may be inherently more difficult to explain 
concisely and in more readable language. However, I do not find that poor 
performance interacts with goals in the predicted manner. Arguments in prior 
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accounting literature (particularly Li [2008]) suggest that reporting complexity will be 
greatest when performance is bad and participants are given explicit instructions to 
prepare a report that will help the division secure future funding (i.e., a strategic 
reporting goal). While this goal does lead participants to provide significantly longer 
reports, the reports are significantly more readable than when participants are only 
given a goal of reporting accurately. Combined, the results do not appear to support 
arguments regarding intentional obfuscation of bad performance.  
In addition to the results discussed above, I also provide some preliminary 
evidence on how other linguistic choices are affected by variation in performance and 
goals. I find that participants use more personal pronouns when performance is good 
than when performance is bad, particularly when they have a strategic reporting goal. 
This is consistent with prior work suggesting that individuals can use personal 
pronouns to associate themselves with a message (Hyland [2005]) and make it more 
persuasive (Asay, Libby and Rennekamp [2012]). I also find that, when performance 
is bad, participants use more past tense language when they have an accuracy goal, 
and more future tense language when they have a goal of creating a favorable 
impression. Future experimental research might investigate additional linguistic 
choices that have been shown to reflect individuals’ motives and circumstances (e.g. 
linguistic tone, causal explanations, etc.). Future research might also investigate both 
written and spoken settings of managerial communication (e.g. annual reports, 
interviews, conference calls, etc.). 
This study is not without some important caveats. First of all, my participants 
are individuals who lack real-world experience preparing financial disclosures. 
However, differences in reporting complexity and abstractness that emerge in response 
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to firm performance are expected to be driven by pervasive psychological phenomena, 
so the use of non-professionals as participants is appropriate (Libby, Bloomfield and 
Nelson [2002]).  Furthermore, I argue that my participants have sufficient knowledge 
to understand the manipulation of managers’ incentives in my experimental task. A 
second concern is that managers’ actual disclosures in the real world may be 
additionally influenced through consultation with legal departments, public-relations 
professionals, etc. Thus, this study serves as a starting point for understanding the 
psychological and incentive-based drivers of qualitative disclosure decisions. It does 
not, however, strictly capture the final disclosures that might actually be provided to 
investors. 
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APPENDIX A – EXAMPLES OF PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK SUGGESTIONS 
PANEL A. LINGUISTIC FEATURES INCLUDED IN THE EXPERIMENTAL 
MANIPULATION OF READABILITY 
Features 
that 
increase 
readability 
Example of a Less Readable 
Disclosure 
Example of a More Readable 
Disclosure 
Short 
sentences 
Stephen Miller, Chief Executive Officer, stated, 
“Sales were above plan, earnings were higher 
than expectations, the Company engaged in the 
execution of several initiatives during the third 
quarter that have it better positioned for the 
future, and the Company’s business strategy is 
to increase sales by expanding distribution of its 
brands in new and existing markets, which is 
intended to raise consumer awareness and trial 
of its products, thus leading to increased 
relevance and purchase intent.” 
Chief Executive Officer, Stephen Miller, stated, 
“Our sales were above plan, our earnings were 
higher than we expected, and we executed several 
initiatives during the third quarter that have us 
better positioned for the future. Our business 
strategy is to increase sales by expanding 
distribution of our brands in new and existing 
markets, raising consumer awareness and trial of 
our products, and increasing relevance and 
purchase intent.” 
Active Voice …which is intended to raise consumer 
awareness and trial of our products, thus 
leading to increased relevance and purchase 
intent. 
…raising consumer awareness and trial of our 
products, and increasing relevance and purchase 
intent. 
No Hidden 
Verbs 
While sales were below plan and earnings were 
lower than expectations, the Company engaged 
in the execution of several initiatives during the 
third quarter that have it better positioned for 
the future. 
While sales were below plan and earnings were 
lower than expected, we executed several 
initiatives during the third quarter that have us 
better positioned for the future. 
No 
Superfluous 
Words 
The decrease in revenue was primarily because 
of the fact that there was a decrease in total 
case sales of 34.5 percent to 2.9 million cases. 
The decrease in revenue was primarily due to a 
decrease in total case sales of 34.5% to 2.9 million 
cases.   
 
Write in the 
Positive 
The Company is not satisfied with what has 
been accomplished so far in fiscal 2009. 
 
We are dissatisfied with what has been 
accomplished so far in fiscal 2009. 
Simple 
Synonyms 
The Company is focused on escalating 
distribution of its products, building and 
maintaining good relationships with key 
distributors; and creating pioneering brands of 
beverages and products. 
The Company is focused on expanding 
distribution of its products, building and 
maintaining good relationships with key 
distributors; and creating innovative brands of 
beverages and products. 
Personal 
Pronouns 
The recent strength of the overall economy and 
financial markets has positively impacted the 
Company’s two primary markets: the U.S. and 
Canada. This has not decreased consumer 
confidence in the economy and the Company 
believes has positively affected consumers’ 
willingness to purchase its products as they 
augment discretionary spending. 
The recent strength of the overall economy and 
financial markets has positively impacted our two 
primary markets: the U.S. and Canada. This has 
increased consumer confidence in the economy and 
we believe has positively affected consumers’ 
willingness to purchase our products as they grow 
their discretionary spending. 
Keep Subject-
Verb- and 
Object in 
order and 
together.  
The table below summarizes revenue and 
earnings performance for the quarter ended 
September 30, 2009, as compared to September 
30, 2008, for Cooper Soda Co (NASDAQ: 
CSOD), a leader in the premium soda category 
and known for its unique branding and 
innovating marketing, which today announced 
results for the quarter ended September 30, 
2009. 
Cooper Soda Co. (NASDAQ: CSOD), a leader in 
the premium soda category and known for its 
unique branding and innovative marketing, today 
announced results for the quarter ended September 
30, 2009.   
 The table below summarizes revenue and 
earnings performance for the quarter ended 
September 30, 2009, as compared to September 30, 
2008. 
 78 
PANEL B. FORMATTING FEATURES INCLUDED IN MY EXPERIMENTAL 
MANIPULATION OF READABILITY 
Features 
that increase 
readability 
Example of a Less Readable Disclosure Example of a More Readable Disclosure 
Clear 
Headings/ 
Hierarchy 
COOPER SODA CO. REPORTS… 
Portland, OR – November 5, 2009 
… 
Outlook 
COOPER SODA CO. REPORTS 
Portland, OR – November 5, 2009 
… 
Outlook 
 
Appropriate 
Layout  
Cooper Soda Co. (NASDAQ: CSOD), a leader in the 
premium soda category and known for its unique branding 
and innovative marketing, today announced results for the 
quarter ended September 30, 2009.   
Cooper Soda Co. (NASDAQ: CSOD), a leader in 
the premium soda category and known for its 
unique branding and innovative marketing, today 
announced results for the quarter ended September 
30, 2009.   
Tables1 The Company acquired Division A from 
Company X in 1986, Division B from Company 
Y in 1991, and Division C from Company Z in 
1998. 
The table below highlights the Company’s 
Acquisitions: 
Division: Acquired 
From: 
Year of 
Acq.: 
A X 1986 
B Y 1991 
C Z 1998 
 
Bullet Points   [The Company] is focused on escalating 
distribution of its products, building and 
maintaining good relationships with key 
distributors; and creating pioneering brands of 
beverages and products. 
 
We are focused on: 
• Expanding distribution of our products; 
• Building and maintaining good 
relationships with our key distributors; 
and 
• Creating innovative beverage brands and 
products. 
1 This example is not from my experiment.  I use a smaller table as an example in this Appendix because of 
space limitations.  See Appendices B and C for my actual manipulation of the use of tables. 
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APPENDIX B – PRESS RELEASES FROM MORE READABLE CONDITIONS 
Panel A. Good News/More Readable Condition 
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Panel B. Bad News/More Readable Condition 
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APPENDIX C – PRESS RELEASES FROM LESS READABLE CONDITIONS 
Panel A. Good News/Less Readable Condition 
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Panel B. Bad News/Less Readable Condition 
Panel B. Bad News/Less Readable Condition 
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